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ABSTRACT
This Master's thesis attempts to construct a
theoretical model of the process of individual insight-
oriented psychotherapy. Its goal is to offer a framework
for organizing the experience of the clinical interaction
in a way that illuminates the nature of clinical influence
and the process of change.
The theoret ical model developed in this thes is
attempts to address three basic questions. First, what
exactly are we referring to when we talk about change?
Second , how should we make sense of the moment to moment
interaction between patient and therapist? Third , what is
the link between the moment to moment interaction in the
therapeut ic situat ion and meaningful psycho log ical change?
The conceptual framework developed to addr es
s
these questions is based on a synthesis of ideas drawn
from a number of theoretical traditions; including
communication /systems theory, psycho- analytic theory
,
cognitive /self theory and information process ing theory.
The thesis 1 theoretical argument begins by pre-
senting a general view of human functioning, based on the
notion that people operate in the world on the basis of
emotional/cognitive "schemata". It extends this thinking
vi
to the clinical process, suggesting that perhaps the most
important kind of change involves the pat ient 1 s
self-schemata; i.e., self-concept
. Having posited what
exactly is being changed in the clinical process, the the-
sis proceeds to identify three ways through which the
therapeutic interaction can foster this kind of change
.
The first channel of influence invo Ives the
therapist f s direct verbal interventions
. In this case
the pat ient es tablishes a new sense of self based on the
novel way the therapist articulates an understanding of
the patient
.
The second channel of influence highlights
the therapist 1 s indirect analogic communication. Here the
emphas is is on meanings that get attached to the
the rap is
t
1
s interact ional stance . These meanings can form
the basis for influencing the patient 1 s self-concept . The
third channel of influence stresses the patient's self-
observation of the therapeutic relationship. The key here
is how the patient sees him or herself interacting with
the therapist. This image of "self in the therapeutic
relationship 11 can , under certain conditions , bring about
important changes in the patient 1 s enduring sense of self.
This is followed by an extended discussion of the
therapeutic interaction. The purpose of this discussion
is to detail the various influences, primarily cognitive
in nature, that can shape the driection of the clinical
* #
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exchange. The point here is to lay the groundwork for
understanding the "Logic" behind the way therapist and
patient respond to each other. The thesis then proceeds
to offer a case iiLustrat ion . The focus here is to
demonstrate one key element of the entire framework: How
the nature of the interaction can challenge the patient's
enduring sense of self (channel of influence #3) . The
thes is concludes by offering some ideas about how one
m ight go about evaluat ing and empirically validat ing the
model
.
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INTRODUCTION
There are a number of personal motivations which
have shaped this Master's thesis. Most importantly, this
project reflects a growing dissatisfaction with the con-
ceptual models available to explain the process of indivi-
dual psychotherapy and the nature of therapeutic change
.
As I have become more involved in the field, I have become
increas ingly struck by the gap between the experience of
doing psychotherapy and the formal theories attempting to
account for that experience
.
To be sure, the library is filled with theories
attempt ing to expla in the clinical proces s . While many of
these efforts have indeed supplied meaningful insights
into the experience of doing psychotherapy , I have yet to
come upon a conceptual system that comfortably works for
me . Part of the difficulty is that , over time , I have
informal ly developed a personal vis ion of the clinical
process--a vis ion that has drawn loosely from a number of
d i verse theoretical sources . This idiosyncrat ic working
image of the Cherapy experience does not readily fit into
any one of the existing theoretical models. As a result,
I have felt compelled to generate my own conceptual
synthesis. In a sense, 1 have taken on the task of
1
2confronting the fundamental question, "How does
psychotherapy work?' 1
,
in a manner that has as its most
important guideline that it be personally convincing.
This thesis has also been guided by the belief
that the relationship between therapist and patient lies
at the heart of the therapeutic process
. Pat lent s get
better or worse largely because of the kind of rela-
t ions hip they are able to develop with their therapist
.
Personal experience, both as a therapist and as a patient,
leaves me convinced that the way in which patient and
therapist fit together is central to the course of treat-
ment . Thus , the answer to the ques t ion "How does therapy
work? " mus t ultimately be based on a detailed examinat ion
of the nature of the therapeutic relationship
.
Unfortunately , the tendency among many clinical
theoris ts is to only give lip service to the importance of
the therapeutic relationship and to quickly pass over it
in order to address more theoretically 11 sophisticated"
aspects of the treatment . The implicit message is that a
careful cons iderat ion of the therapis t-pat ient rela-
tionship is an exercise in the obvious, and that every
seasoned therapist should already have a good sense of the
basic features of a facilitative relationship. This the-
sis challenges this tendency. One might view this as an
effort to make theoretically respectable a personal
3intuition about the centrality of the therapist-patient
relationship
.
The goal of this Master's thesis is ambitious. I
will attempt to construct a theoretical model of the pro-
cess of individual ins ight-or iented psychotherapy. 1 The
hope is to fashion a method for organizing the experience
of psychotherapy in a way that illuminates the nature of
clinical influence and change. Perhaps the following list
of questions will help to further clarify the nature of my
conceptual task. These questions crystalize the issues
that my model will attempt to address.
1 . What exactly are we referring to when we talk
about change? What is be ing changed?
2 . How should we make sense of the moment to
moment interact ion between patient and
therapist? How can we organize clinical
process ?
3 . What is the link between the moment to moment
interaction in the therapeutic situation and
meaningful psychological change? In other
1 The term individual insight-oriented
psychotherapy is meant to designate all but the most symp-
tom oriented behavioral approaches. This includes any
therapy where understanding and the making of meaning are
acknowledged as being an important part of the thera-
peutic process
.
4words, what exactly ttanspires between client
and therapist that fosters change?
The answer to these questions will be based on a synthesis
of a number of ideas prominent in the field today. In
particular. I will be drawing on the ideas of the com-
munication and systems theorists, the ideas of psycho-
dynamic theorists, the thinking of the cognitive-self
theorists and, finally, notions from information pro-
cessing theory.
The emphasis on theory is based on the belief that
the first step toward a rigorous examination of the
psychotherapeutic experience is to devise a set of
appropriate conceptual tools. We need a framework- - in the
form of sensitizing concepts--to guide our observation.
Without firm theoretical grounding, psychotherapy research
is prone to become, in spite of the most sophisticated
empirical and analytical techniques, an irrelevant exer-
cise in counting for its own sake. The following passage
forcefully makes this point.
One of the most serious criticisms that can be
made of the research employing content analysis
is that the "findings" have no clear signifi-
cance for either theory or practice. In
reviewing the work in this field, one is struck
by the number of studies which apparently have
been guided by a sheer fascination with
counting. Unfortunately, it is possible for
content analysis to meet all the requirements of
objectivity and quant if ication .. .without making
5any appreciable contribution to theory or prac-
tice. It is all too common an error to equate
"scientific" with "reliable and quantitative".
Unless the findings of a content analysis have
implications for some theory
, however vaguely
formulated
, the study can merit serious atten-
tion only on the highly tenuous claim that some
day the significance of the findings will become
apparent
. It should be apparent that the value
of a content analys is will depend upon the
quality of the a priori conceptualization
.
(Cartwright, 1966, p. 447-448)
Taking Cartwright 1 s cue, my primary task will be to work
out such an "a priori conceptual i z at ion . " Carl Rogers
(1961 ) , taking a slightly different perspective , offers
another reason why , in studying certain types of pheno-
mena
,
theory is so absolutely crucial
.
Obj ect ive research slices through the frozen
moment to provide us with an exact picture of
the interrelationships which exist at that
moment. But our understanding of the ongoing
moment- -whether it be the process of fermen-
tation, or the circulation of the blood, or the
process of atomic fission--is generally by a
theoretical formulation. . . . (1961, p. 127).
Thus, when it comes to making sense out of process
phenomena, like psychotherapy, the central task is to
develop narrative explanations that link events over time.
Perhaps the most appropriate method to initially generate
these narrative explanations is through an act of
participant-conceptualization and not by the collection
and manipulation .of static measurements. This effort is
guided by this fundamental epistomological orientation.
6The thesis is divided into two main sections. In
Part One, I discuss the theoretical foundations which have
guided my conceptual effort. This includes an examination
of the initial assumptions which have influenced my
thinking. It also includes a review of the work of three
prominent clinical theorists upon whose work I have drawn
most directly. This first section concludes with the pre-
sentation of an overall framework for understanding how
humans funct ion in the world . This metapsychology provi-
des a general theoretical context for the ideas which are
to follow.
In Part Two , I develop a set of ideas devoted to
explaining the process of therapeut ic influence . This
theoretical model is discussed in terms of three
"channels" of influence. The third channel of influence,
which stresses the importance of the the rap is t-pat ient
interaction
,
provokes a detailed discuss ion of the pragma-
t ics of the therapeutic interaction. This is followed by
a chapter that identifies some of the conditions which
facilitate the process of change. In the next chapter I
attempt to demonstrate part of the theoretical model
(channel of influence #3) with a case illustration. In
the final section, I confront the question of how one
might go about evaluating the model and share some per-
sonal reflections on this project.
PART ONE
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER I
INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS
This chapter begins with a list of the basic
working assumptions that have guided my thinking about the
psychotherapy process. This rather loose collection of
assertions provides a backdrop to the theoretical model
which will be presented. These working assumptions have
evolved over a period of time-based partly on personal
experience, partly on discussions with other therapists,
and partly on a selective reading of the clinical litera-
ture. Although I am claiming this to be my personal list,
it is clear that these assumptions are part of important
currents in contemporary clinical thought. To acknowledge
this larger context, I have made it a point to include the
words and thinking of others in the field.
The Centrality of the Therapeutic
Relationship
As has already been stressed in the introduction,
psychotherapy and the process of change can best be
understood in terms of tne therapis t--pat ient relation-
ship. Rather than being merely a pre-condition to the
influence process--as only "setting the stage"--the thera-
8
9peutic relationsip is the very medium through which change
gets transacted. Bordin (1959) make the point thus:
The key to the influence of psychotherapy, on
the patient is in his relationship with the
therapist. Wherever psychotherapy is accepted
as a significant enterprise, this statement is
so widely subscribed to as to become trite.
Virtually all efforts to theorizes about
psychotherapy are intended to describe and
explain what attributes of the interactions bet-
ween the therapist and the patient will account
for whatever behavior changes results (p. 235).
Starting with Ferenzci's (1950) initial break
with Freud, the debate as to whether relational factors,
as opposed to technical factors, lie at the heart of the
corrective process has been a prominent feature in
discussions of clinical theory. Fairbairn's (1958) object
relations view of the analytic situation; Winnocott's
(1965) concept of the "holding environment"; the
nurturant-recons truct ive approaches taken by From-Reichman
(1954), Little (1951), Guntrip (1961), and Kohut (1971);
Alexander's (1946) notion of the "corrective emotional
experience"; Greenson's (1981) ideas about the "real
relationship"; Rogers' (1961) "facilitative conditions";
Frank's (1961) "non-specific" healing factors; and, more
recently Lang's (1976) use of the notion "bi-personal
field," all represent attempts to expand the argument that
psychotherapy can best be understood in terms of rela-
tional factors.
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Moreover, an accumulating amount of empirical evi-
dence has pointed in this direction (see Garfield &
Bergin, 1978, for a comprehensive review of this
literature). Specifically, it has been shown that effec-
tive clinical relationships tend to have certain
characteristics. These characteristics are determined, in
part, by the personal characteristics brought to the rela-
tionship by both the patient and therapist. Moreover, it
has been shown that the interaction of patient and thera-
pist characteristics, i.e., the nature of their rela-
t ions hip
,
is as important in determining outcome as the
characteristics of the members of either group considered
separately (Cartwright and Lerner, 1 963; Rogers, et al.
,
1967).
Perhaps another way of stating this view is that
the real relationship that exists between patient and
therap is t plays a crucial role in the therapeut ic proces s
.
In a class ic paper , Greens on ( 1 982 ) summarizes this
pos it ion from a psychoanalytic per s pec t ive
:
. . . a survey of the recent psy choanal yt ic
1 iterature reveals that a significant number of
psychoanalysts, a group too heterogeneous to be
class if ied , do not deny the special value of
trans ference phenomena and trans ference
interpretations , but maintain that the total
relat ions hip between the patient and the analyst
must be taken into account in order to fully
understand and handle the vicissitudes of the
psychoanalytic situation. They believe that a
wide assortment of object relations, other than
11
transference
, takes place in the course of an
analysis in both patient and the therapist. It
is their contention that the proper handling of
these "nontransference
,
11
"extra transference
,
"
or "real" interactions are an indispens ible
ingredient for sucessful psychoanalytic treat-
ment (p. 87-88).
What are the implications of this assumption,
especially in terms of our ef forts to cons truct a
theoret ical model of the psychotherapy process ? Perhaps
,
most importantly, we are forced to move beyond describing
what is happening only to the patient and, instead, expand
our focus to include the the rap is t- patient dyad
. This
requires a set of conceptual tools that can link the dyna-
mics of the therapeut ic interact ion to changes within the
patient
.
The Importance of Looking
at Interpersonal Process
Patterns of moment to moment interaction are what
ultimately characterize any human relationship, including
the therapist-patient relationship . Thus , the therapeutic
relationship is more than just an amorphous, subjective
entity (i.e., warm
,
empathetic , hostile , etc . ) but
,
instead, is an ongoing process of transactions that tend
to settle into discernable patterns. Through careful
observation, these patterns and the transactions that go
into making them, can eventually be characterized.
12
Strupp (1973) articulates this as follows:
Freud conceived of psychotherapy (subsuming
psychoanalysis), particularly in his early work,
as a set of treatment techniques analogous to a
surgical procedure performed by a physician on a
patient. Psychotherapists following Freud gra-
dually became convinced that psychotherapy must
be understood in terms of the interactions or
transactions between patient and therapist.
This conceptual change had far-reaching implica-
tions, leading eventually to the view that the
communication between the two participants is
critical. Stated in another way, if one is
interested in understanding the process of
psychotherapeutic change, one must look at the
psychotherapeutic process . The crucial infor-
mation is somehow embedded in the verbal and
non-verbal communications , and it is the job of
the researcher to impose order on the proces s in
a way that meaningful answers emerge (p. XIII).
The work of the communication theorists is especially
relevant here. Bateson (1972), Jackson (1968), Haley
(1963), and Watzlavick (1967) have all contributed to this
important way of viewing human relat ions hips . Much like
two dancers
,
therapist and patient are continuously moving
in coord inat ion with each other through their common
interactional space . It is the task of the careful
observer to get beyond the general "feel" conveyed by
these moves and, instead, characterize the particular
moves, or combinations of interpersonal moves, that give
each therapy its distinct ive flavor . It is in the pat-
terning of these interpersonal moves and counter moves
that we will eventually be able to understand the process
of therapeutic change
.
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The Importance of Inner Experience
Relationships involve much more than the exchange
of overt interpersonal behaviors. Each participant is
also involved in a host of ongoing cognitive-affective
activities that directly mediate the course of the overt
interaction. Anchin (1982 makes this similar point:
. • . any interaction entails far more than
overt behavioral exchange. Indeed, the very
meaning and impact of an interaction stems from
the fact that
, simultaneous with the flow of
overt events
, each interact ant cont inuously
engages in a rapidly firing, complex, yet orga-
nized set of covert affective and cognitive pro-
cesses. These processes influence the
perception and interpretation of the overt acts,
their nature and course, and the personal and
relational meanings that are derived from them,
(p.' 101 ).
This view has been addressed by a number of
perspectives in psychology. For example
,
person-
perception research (Laing & Esters on , 1 964) , the analysis
of behavior from a social learning perspective (Bandura,
1 977) , the writings of the cognitive-behavioral theorists
(Mahoney , 1 977) and even the formulations of analyt ic ally-
oriented thinkers (Leowald, 1960) all highlight the affec-
tive and cognitive components of interpersonal behavior.
Notions like 11 interpersonal cons trual , " "trait
attribution , " Mgeneral ized assumptions about self and
other, M all point to ways in which internal processes
mediate our interact ions with others . It follows , then
,
14
that a truly complete model of psychotherapy must pay
close attention to both the therapist's and patient's
internal experience of the unfolding relationship. While
this unavoidably makes the task of understanding the
therapeutic transaction more inferential, such inferential
data is ind ispens ible in constructing a meaningfl picture
of what is really transpiring.
The Appropriateness of a
Cybernetic Epistomology
Interpersonal behavior is embedded in a feedback
network where theconcept of linear causality is no longer
appropriate. The study of such processes should, instead,
be grounded in an epistomology stressing mutual influence
and circular causality. Danziger (1976) notes, in
contrasting linear and circular conceptions of causality,
that the feedback inherent in any human transaction
implies that "two individuals in interaction are simulta-
neously the causes and the effects of each other's
behavior" (p. 84).
This view of human interaction has certainly left
an important mark on the shape of clinical theory. In
addition to the moredrastic revisions offered by the
systems theorists (Jackson, 1968; Levenson, 1972; Haley,
1963), there is also an increasing tendency among
1 5
psychoanalysts to acknowledge the reciprocal nature of the
therapeutic situation. This is especially apparent in
more recent discussions of the concept of countertrans
-
ference (Racker
,
1968; Searles
,
1979; Langs, 1982).
This circular view of causality makes the task of
articulating a model of psychotherapy much more
challenging. One difficulty is that our language is
steeped in the tradition of linear thinking. The very
medium which we have to communicate such a model can
actually undermine the effort. In addition, the task of
portraying all of the communicat ional loops can be
overwhelming, if not impossible. There always exists one
more feedback link or one more level of context to take
into consideration. We are, thus, forced to more openly
acknowledge the limitations of any model bui-lding effort
and realize that it is only through a compromise; i.e., by
restricting the scope and complexity with which we attempt
to depict "reality," that we are able to keep things
manageable
.
The Importance of the Notion of Fit
The manner in which therapist and patient come
together and blend their respective styles— the way they
" f it"--determines , to a great extent, the course and out-
come of their relationship. The choice of the spatial
16
metaphor here; i.e., two people "fitting" together, is
especially appropriate because it re-emphasizes the alter-
native epistoraology suggested in assumption #4. In other
words, the therapist does not "do" something to the
patient that "causes" the patient to change. Instead,
employing this notion of fit, both participants go through
a process of mutual accommodation as they negotiate
(usually at a level out of awareness) how they are going
to share the ir common interactional space
. Change
, if it
should occur, is largely a product of that meshing
process
.
Dell (1982), drawing on the thinking of Bateson
(1972) and Maruyaina (1 963) employes the term "fit" to draw
what he views to be a revolutionary distinction about the
way we can under s t and human behavior . His point is that
we should not try to under s t and people in terms of causal
antecedents ( linear or circular) but , rather
,
by examining
the way we interface with our social environments
. From
his per s pec t ive , concepts like complement ari ty , evo lut ion
,
structural determinism, as well as "fitness" offer more
explanatory power than the concept of causal i ty
.
Leary (1957) provides perhaps the most elegant
attempt to operational ize this concept of "fit" through
the use of a two- factor (dominance vs . submission and hate
vs . love) circumplex having behavioral ly defined segments
.
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His circle is essentially a device for breaking down
interpersonal behavior into a functional system of classes
or categories. In a sense, he has devised a taxonomy of
interpersonal behavior. What makes his work especially
relevant to this discussion is that it suggests that every
interpersonal style pulls for a particular well defined
complementary response and that such interpersonal pulls
gain their force from the fact that certain styles
naturally fit together
.
A growing number of theorists have made this con-
cept central in their thinking about the clinical process.
Beir (1966), Carson (1968), Wachtel (1976), and Levenson
(1972) all suggest, in one form or another, that the way
in which a therapist and client fit together (and espe-
cially the way the fit is altered through the course of
therapy) lies at the core of the healing process. Perhaps
Levenson 91 972), in attempting to explain how a part icular
type of non-fit is crucial to the process of therapeutic
change , makes this point most poetically
:
The funct ion of the the rap is t is through aware-
ness to resist transformation. Like a con-
t inuous discordant note , he shifts the melody.
What emerges is still the patient's private myth
. . . but a myth shifted to account for new
data. . . . The therapist . . . acts from
t
within the structure of the patient's transac-
tional field--as it were, by being unassimi-
lated. The patient can reject the therapy (as
of course does, happen) or he can encapsulate it
( as in those interminable twenty- year M pearls of
18
cKngTnr(p.°214
h
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Finally, Guntrip (1975) offers a nice bridge to
the next assumption (assumption #6) by suggesting that a
productive therpeutic fit may be largely unrelated to the
theoretical or technical prowess of the therapist, but may
instead, occur naturally:
.
. .
psychoanalytic therapy is not a purely
theoretical but a truly understanding personal
relationship.
. . . But the capacity for
forming a relationship does not depend solely on
our theory. Not everyone has the same facility
for forming personal relationships, and we can
all form a relationship more easily with some
people than with othere. The unpredictable fac-
tor of "natural fit" enters in. (p. 146).
The Importance of the Therapist's
Personality
Who the therapist is as a real person has an enor-
mous influence on the course of any psychotherapy. For
better or worse, the therapist's individual qualities--
personality, attitudes, beliefs, interests, values, and
style--play a central role in shaping the therapeutic
interaction. No matter how rigorous one's training and
grounding in proper technique, the idiosyncracies intro-
duced into the treatment by the therapist's personality
cannot be wholly submerged.' Instead, these personal
characteristics should be understood as laying at the core
of the therapeutic process. In what was later to be a
19
common theme among the humanists and existentialists, Jung
(1934) wrote:
It is in fact largely immaterial what sort of
techniques he uses, for the point is not tech-
nique
. . .
the personality and attitude of thedoctor are at supreme importance
--whether he
appreciates this fact or not.
. . . (1964 n
159-160). ' F *
Fairbairn (1958) echoes this view, from a slightly
different obj ect- relat ions perspective
:
The relationship existing between patient and
analyst is more important than details of
technique; and it would seem to follow that the
role of the analyst is not merely to fulfill the
dual functions of (1) a screen upon which the
patient proj ects his fantasies , and (2) a
colourless instrument of interpretive technique
,
but that his personality and his motives make a
significant contr ibut ion to the therapeut ic pro-
cess (p. 59) .
Over the years , this pos it ion has evolved into a
detailed exam inat ion of exact ly how the therapi s
t
1
s per-
sonal ity can affect the therapeut ic proces s . Thus , Truax
6c Mitchell (1971), from a client- centered perspective
;
Fromm-Reichman (1954) and Sullivan (1953) from an
interpersonal framework; Racker (1968), Little (1951),
Winnocott (1965), and Langs (1976, 1978) from a psychoana-
lytic point of view, and Carson (1968) from an interac-
tional perspective, have all attempted to refine our
understanding of how the therapist's personality can
contribute or detract from the clinical effort . To
supplement this clinical literature is a well established
20
body of more formal empirical research that clearly
demonstrates that certain personal qualities of the thera-
pist can positively affect the outcome of psychotherapy.
For an extensive review of this literature see Parloff et
al.
,
(1979).
Perhaps the strongest testimony supporting this
position comes from the very structure of the psychoanaly-
tic profession
--a structure that requires all of its can-
didates to undergo an extensive training analysis.
Carson (1968), using the interactional framework developed
from Leary's (1957) earlier work, makes this point in a
more specific manner:
If the effect iveness of the therapist is depen-
dent in part on his ability to move the client
at will through various portions of the interac-
tion matrix, it follows that the success of
therapy will in turn depend in part on the
therapist' s capacity to adopt stances complemen-
tary to those with which the client needs to
experience
. The most generally effective thera-
pist should be one who can move comfortably to
virtually any pos it ion in the matrix , a charac-
teristic that is tantamount to maximum personal
adjustment (p. 288)
.
It follows, then, that any model of psychotherapy
attempting to incorporate this assumption must make
explicit this link between the personal qualities of the
therap is t and .the course of the therapeut ic interact ion
.
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The Similarity Between the Psychotherapy
Relationship and Other Relationship^ ^
i n Facilitat_ing3^ljZE"
The manner in which patients are influenced and
change in psychotherapy has much in common with the way
people change outside the clinical setting. The "good"
therapy relationship mirrors, in many ways, those rare,
naturally occurring relationships that result in meaning-
ful change. Kiesler (1982) makes this point forcefully.
The rock bottom assumption of interpersonal
therapy is that the client-- therapist interac-
tion, despite its unique characteristics, is
similar in major ways to any other human tran-
saction (p . 14).
This assumption serves to widen the scope of our
theoretical effort. Instead of relying exxlusively on our
observations of the clinical situation, we can expand our
field of vision and look elsewhere for additional leads
about how relationships change people. It follows, then,
that any theory of psychotherapy should be informed by our
understanding of human interaction and change, in general.
In this light, the views of many non-clinical theorists
become relevant to our effort, including the work of the
communication theorists (Bateson, 1972; Haley, 1963;
Watzlavick et al., 1967), the social psychologists (Mead,
1934; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Goffman, 1959; Strong and
Claiborn, 1982, for a recent synthesis), and the interper-
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sonal personality theorists (Sullivan, 1 953; Leary, 1 957
;
Anchin and Kiesler, 1982; and Magnus son, 1977). In addi-
tion, the insights gained from developmental psychology
may be helpful. Thus, we might also be able to refine our
thinking about the therapist-patient relationship by
looking closely at the facilitive dimensions of the
healthy parent-child interaction (Winnocott, 1965;
Leowald, 1960).
The Importance of Self/Other
Representat ions
Psychotherapy, in its most meaningful form, provi-
des patients with the opportunity to alter inner models of
self and relationships
. It is an attempt to change core
assumptions about oneself and one's social world . Jerome
Frank (1963) makes this point very direct ly
:
The aim of psychotherapy is to help a person to
feel and funct ion better by enab ling him to make
appropriate mod i f icat ions in his as sumpt ive
world (p. 37 and 38)
.
Accord ing to Frank , the term 11 as sumpt ive world" can ulti-
mately be defined in terms of internal representations of
self and other:
(The term "assumptive world") is a short hand
express ion for a highly structured complex
,
interacting set of values
,
expectations , and
images of oneself and others, which guide and in
turn are guided by a person 1 s perceptions and
behavior and which are closely related to his
emot ional states and his feelings of well be ing
(p. 27).
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This assumption is echoed over and over again in
a variety of forms throughout the clinical literature.
Strachey's (1934) classic description of the treatment
process, Roger's (1954) pioneering psychotherapy outcome
research, Kelley's (1955) innovative clinical technique,
Kohut's (1971) reformulation of psychoanalytic metap-
sychology and even Eric Berne's (1961) transactional ana-
lysis all draw upon the common fundamental notion that
therapeutic change involves shifts in the patient's inner
representations of self and others.
One implication of this view is that it is not
enough to describe change in psychotherapy simply in terms
of changes in overt behavioral tendencies or observable
relational patterns. Our explanation most ultimately be
grounded in an appreciation of how internal processes,
especially the ways in which we perceive and attach
meaning to our social experience, shape our patterns of
behaving in the world. The patient's meaning structure
and the cognitive patterns which generate these structures
must be at the center of any model of psychotherapy pro-
cess and change.
The obvious conceptual task, then, is to make
explicit the link between the therapeutic interaction and
these inner models of apprehending reality. The thinking
of the self-theorists (Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959;
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Cottral, 1969; and Epstein, 1980) and the symbolic
interactionists (Head, 1934; Blumer, 1968) are espe-
cially relevant here. What ultimately must be explained,
and eventually empirically demonstrated, is the connection
between specific therapist-patient transactions (or pat-
terns of transaction) and changes in the way in which a
patient goes about viewing himself and his social world.
There are undoubtedly additional predilections
which have influenced the thinking behind this thesis.
However, these eight assumptions describe the most impor-
tant elements of the world view which lies behind this
work. Another way of viewing these assumptions is that
they represent one set of criteria for evaluating what is
to follow. Thus, the merit of the theoretical model that
is to be described will partly depend on how well it works
within this set of theoretical parameters.
CHAPTER II
THREE MODELS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY
What follows is a discussion of three efforts to
develop a conceptual model of the psychotherapeutic pro-
cess. These particular models have been chosen because
they offer, each from a slightly different vantage point,
a compelling synthesis of many of my own ideas. They
represent, in a sense, the state of the art in terms of
the conceptual work that has been done towards under-
standing psychotherapy from an interaction-process point
of view. Because of the complexity and richness of each
of these models, my discussion must necessarily be
limited. After briefly summarizing their major theoreti-
cal points, I consider each model's specific strengths.
The discussion ends with a look at the limitations of each
mode 1
.
Robert Carson
Perhaps the strongest effort to integrate the
interactional point of view can be found in Robert
Carson's pioneering book, Interaction Concepts of
Personality (1968). This stimulating work is one of the
earliest attempts to synthesize a model of psychotherapy
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based on the interpersonal psychiatry of Sullivan (1953),
the social exchange notions of Thibaut and Kelley (1959),
and the interpersonal psychology of Leary (1957).
His starting point is that we behave the way we do
based on an inner set of socially generated images of our
place in the world. These images of Self and Other are
based largely on the feedback one receives from his or her
social environment. This view of personality provides
Carson with a powerful way of understanding why people
tend to stay the same and why meaningful change is often
so difficult
.
People pers is t in fixed patterns of beha-
vior because their inner set of perceptions
,
expectations
,
and "ways of seeing" tend to be confirmed by the interper-
sonal consequences of the ir very own beahvior
. In other
words
,
people remain the way they are , for better or
worse, because of the consistency of the feedback which
they provoke from those around them.
Based on this cognitive- interpersonal view of per-
sonality, Carson describes his view of the clinical
process
:
The role of the therapist is to provide his
client with experiences that result in an expan-
sion and loosening of the client ! s Image of
Self. Success in this venture would free the
client from his slavish devot ion to the main-
tenance of a constricted Selfhood, and from his
need to manufacture crucial evidence in its sup-
port. . . . The therapist must cause the
client's Image to be changed, particularly that
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aspect of it constituting the client's fundamen-tal concepts of himself in relation to the
world.
_
The focus of the effort is therefore a
cognitive, or at least quas i- cogni t ive struc-ture. In a sense, the client needs to be pro-
vided with a different and more adequate set ofbeliefs about himself and his life (1968, p.
The crucial question, of course, is the exact nature of
such "experiences that result in an expansion and
loosening of the client's Image of Self." Carson attempts
to answer this by describing the "cardinal therapeutic
tactic" in the following way:
The therapist must avoid the adoption of an
interpersonal position complementary to and con-
firmatory of the critical self
-protect ive posi-
tion to which the client will almost invariably
attempt to move in the course of the therapeutic
interaction. In other words, the therapist must
be one person in the client's life--and he will
frequently be the only one in a sustained
r elat ionship--who does not yield to the client's
pressure to supply confirmatory information
(analogic or digital) to the latter's crippled
self (1968, p. 180)
.
Carson's work is important for several reasons.
At the most general level, he synthesizes a number of
important interpersonal principals into an integrated
depiction of the clinical process. More specifically, he
has clearly identified what ideally gets transformed in
psychotherapy: The patient's working image of Self and
Other. He has also articulated how this change comes
about: The therapist disconfirms the patient's inner ima-
ges of Self and Other by offering non- complementary
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responses to the patient's habitual patterns of relating.
What remains to be done is to flesh out this basic
outline. Carson's conceptual map has to be made more spe-
cific so it can be more accurately applied to the
complexities of real life clinical data.
One area of the map that remains conspicuously
uncharted is the process by which a therapist arrives at a
response to the patient. A truly interactional view of
the therapeutic exchange must carefully consider the
interactional dynamics in terms of both participants,
including the therapist. Carson alludes to this only
briefly, suggesting that the flexibility of the
therapist's personality plays a major role in his or her
ability to take on a variety of appropriate non-confirming
s tances
.
. . . the success of therapy will in turn depend
in part on the therapist's capacity to adopt
stances complementary to those with which the
client needs to have experience.
Carson's model falls short of specifying how the therapist
manages to do this (or alternatively, is unable to do it).
What also needs to be more fully developed is the
exact mechanism by which the therapist's non-confirmatory
responses do (or, in some cases, do not) result in a
shift in the patient. To simply say, on an abstract
level, that therapists' non-complementary responses result
29
in patients changing is not enough.
Finally, Carson remains firmly entrenched in the
epistomology of linear causation. The therapist
"provides" the patient with a response which "causes" a
shift in the patient's view of him or herself and the
world. An important refinement to his model would be to
recast this view of causality into terms that are truly
interactional; so that both therapist and patient are seen
as participating in a mutual dance of cause and effect.
Robert Langs
For over a decade, the psychoanalytic investigator
Robert Langs has written prolifically and forcefully in
favor of a communicat ional model of the psychoanalytic
conversation. For a representative collection of his work
see Langs (1978). His emphasis has been on examining and
conceptualizing the analytic method from an interactional
perspective which focuses on the reality of the shared
activity between the two participants in the psychoanaly-
tic dialogue. He uses the term "bipersonal field" as his
primary metaphor for depicting the clinical situation.
This metaphor stresses the interactional qualities of the
therapeutic process and postulates that every experience
and communication within the "field" receives vectors from
both patient and therapist. His important message is that
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such vectors do not originate exclusively from the patient
(i.e., the patient's transference) but can just as likely
originate from the therapist as well. The work of therapy
is to use the reality of this unfolding communicat ional
field as a basis for self-understanding.
He uses the term "adaptive context" to designate
this unfolding reality and contends that the words and
actions of the therapist are perhaps its most important
features. Whatever the patient says about himself or his
world "out there" is colored by the stimuli coming from
the therapist.
Every communication from the patient and
the therapist must be considered in terms of the
ongoing therapeutic interaction and in terms of
the adaptive qualities of each response
. (p.
461 ) .
Accord ing to Langs , it is of prime importance to
" get hold" of such alius ions ; to acknowledge the inf luence
of the adapt ive context and to use the pat ient 1 s (as well
as the the rap is t 1 s) react ions to the here and now as a
tool for gaining acces s and ins ight into the hidden mental
1 if e of the patient . One consequence of this view is that
the " interact ional realm takes precedence , and must be
understood first . . . before interpreting unconscious
content
,
fantasy , memories ." (1976, p. 419).
While Langs pays strict allegience to the classi-
cal psychoanalytic tenet stress ing the primacy of ins ight
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(and, by extension, the centrality of the therapist's
interpretive work), what makes his thinking particularly
innovative is his willingness to appreciate purely
interactional components of the curative process. Using
the clinical insights first arrived at by the Kleinians,
Langs pictures the clinical process as a back and forth,
largely unconscious, exchange of " introj ects . " What
allows this process to be curative is the therapist's abi-
lity to absorb and process the patient's pathological
introj ects and, in turn, give them back to the patient in
a form that can be more adaptively used. Langs uses R.
Fleiss' (1953) phrase "the metabolizing of projective
identifications" to describe this process.
There are a number of ideas in Langs' thinking
that have been particularly useful in my own theoretical
effort. His use of the "bi-personal field" metaphor, his
emphasis of the "adaptive context," and his stress on the
importance of countertransference are all ideas that I
have incorporated into my own interactional perspective.
In addition, Langs employs a number of concepts that
creatively blend interactive with intrapsychic phenomenon.
Processes which Langs identifies as "metabolizing," "trial
identification," and "detoxification" are clearly intrap-
sychic events, yet they are discussed as being embedded in
the context of a larger interactional sequence.
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Similarly, processes such as projective identification,
introjective identification, and projective counteriden-
tification
--all important mechanisms in Langs' conception
of the therapeutic interaction—combine external com-
municational dimensions with internal affective-cognitive
d imens ions
.
Finally, Langs offers us an attractive research
methodology. He suggests that we perform case-specific
and session-specific micro-analyses of actual clinical
material. He asserts that this kind of detailed
retrospective examination of the therapeutic process is
the only way to obtain meaningful validation of our
hypotheses. In fact he provides us with a very simple
formula for conducting such a validating process (and
demonstrates it in several of his books)
:
Within the clinical situation, the
following validat ing sequence is essent ial
:
Material from the patient, intervention by the
therapist , validation from the pat i en t- -and
,
secondarily, from the therapist (1978, p. 38 6).
Langs continues with some add it ional guidelines on the
valid it ing proces s
.
Clinical validat ion should occur in two
spheres : cognitive and interact ional- ident if i-
catory . In regard to the f irs t area , true
confirmation constitutes the revelation of pre-
vious ly repressed material which helps to re-
organize the previous association, sheds
unforeseen light on the material, and provides
truly original insights into the patient's
current anxieties, conflicts, and inner mental
life. . . .
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In the interactional-identification realmderivatives of a positive introjective iden-tification should appear in the material fromthe patient subsequent to a valid intervention.Such responses are based on an unconscious
mtrojection of the therapist's valid func-tioning as reflected in his insightful interpre-tive efforts (1973, p. 386 and 387).
This methodology, particularly his second interac-
tional approach toward confirmig clinical hypotheses,
seems well suited to the kind of cognitive interactional
notions developed in my model of the therapeutic interac-
t ion
.
Perhaps the most important area of divergence bet-
ween Langs' thinking and my own is around the relative
importance of insight. While Langs acknowledges that one
avenue of cure is obj ect- relat ional , he fails to develop
the full interactional implications of this point of view.
For Langs, the therapeutic object relation is achieved
primarily through the therapist's ability to appropriately
manage the maladaptive interactional pressures of the
patient. In more psychoanalytic terms, this involves the
ability to detoxify the patient's pathological projective
identifications. The way the therapist does this,
according to Langs, is by steadfastly sticking to the task
of facilitating affectively meaningful insight. Such an
interactional stance signals to the patient that what he
or she is presenting to the therapist is tolerable. There
34
is an implicit green light to share more and go deeper,
with the assurance that what might emerge will be con-
tainable. Thus, the primary curative tactic is very much
equated with the ability to facilitate insight.
My view, in contrast, is that our understanding of
the interactional components of the therapeutic process
need not be viewed only in terms of the therapist's abi-
lity to generate insight. Therapists can respond to
patients in a variety of ways that can result in meaning-
ful and enduring change. The facilitation of self-
exploration and self-understanding is only one available
alternative. The task, of course, is to generate a con-
ceptual framework that can accommodate this expanded
notion of the process of change.
Mardi Horowitz
The ideas of Mardi Horowitz (1979) represent an
ambitious effort to grapple with the question of how
people change in psychotherapy. Drawing from a wide
variety of theoretical traditions, both in and out of
psy choanalays is , Horowitz presents a method,
" conf igurat ional analysis," that organizes how one should
observe and make sense of the clinical process. His
framework revolves around three basic dimensions to track
the moment to moment dynamics of the clinical process.
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His "state" analysis is based on the idea that
people are continuously passing through a number of
"recurrent patterns of experience and behavior." These
"states" are experienced as distinct phenomenolog ical
entities, each made up of a unique combination of beha-
vioral, emotional, and relational tendencies. Words like
"mood," "state of mind," and "level of consciousness" ail
capture a bit of the concept. Moreover, Horowitz asserts
that by carefully observing changes in facial expression,
intonation in speech, arousal level, focus and content of
verbal reports, degree of self-reflective awareness, and
other qualities in the patient's experience specific states
can not only be characterized but that the transitions
from one to another can be pinpointed. From this perspec-
tive, people change when they alter the way they distri-
bute their time among their repertoire of states. Change
also occurs when new states (i.e., new constellations of
feeling and behaving) expand a person's repertoire of
s tates
.
The second dimension in Horowitz' conf igurat ional
analysis involves what he terms "self-images and role
relationships." These are the inner models which organize
and influence the ways people view themselves in relation
to others. In Horowitz' view, one's view of self is
always embedded in the context of a relationship. The
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concept of self is, thus, very much a interpersonal con-
cept. People run into difficulties when they spend too
much time operating from maladaptive and/or painful inner
self /object images. Therapeutic change involves a shift
in the ways the patient uses these inner models such that
more adoptive and less painful "filters" come to dominate
a person's way of seeing self and the world.
Horowitz suggests that everyone, no matter how
integrated or mature, has a multiplicity of such images.
In his view, everyone draws from a personal repertoire of
such models. The task of therapy, in one sense, is to
increase the likelihood that the patient will fall back on
those particular images which allow him or her to function
more satisfactorily.
The third feature in Horowitz' conf igurat ional
analysis focuses on the patient's pattern of information
processing. What concerns Horowitz here is the "software"
of the patient, particularly those conflicted ideational
constellations that lead the patient into difficulty.
From this perspective, each "state" is characterized by a
particular routine with its unique pattern of asso-
ciations. In a sense, this is the most important aspect
of Horowitz' model, for it is through the patient's cogni-
tive apparatus that the clinical process exerts its
influence. Change, according to Horowitz, results from
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new ways of processing the information we have about our-
selves and our world.
What is perhaps most exciting about Horowitz 1
model is that it represents a serious attempt to capture
the full complexity of the clinical situation. His model
acknowledges the large array of factors that play a role
in the therapeutic interaction. To do this, Horowitz is
forced to weave together a number of divergent strands in
current clinical theory—ranging from psychoanalytic
metapsychology to recent advaces in cognitive theory.
His book, in some places, reads more like a chemistry
text and reminds us that the task of modelling the clini-
cal situation in a way that is clinically relevant is
necessarily a demanding one. However, his use of a multi-
layered micro-analysis suggest that there are ways to keep
such complexity manageable
.
Horowitz has not only attempted to bridge the gap
between clinical practice and clinical theory, he has also
attempted to bridge the gap between clinical theory and
empirical validat ion . This effort is based on two guid ing
principles. First, his methodology clearly reflects a
commitment to linking clinical inference and explanation
to concrete observables. His use of video, detailed case
trans cr ipt ions , and group consensual observation are al
1
attempts to strengthen the link between theory and clini-
38
cal data.
Second, Horowitz' methodology reflects the growing
disenchantment among modern clinical researchers with
standard statistical procedures and the realization that
only a limited amount can be learned from comparison of
mean differences between groups. Instead, he has devised
a system of empirical validation that is based on the.
intensive analysis and observation of a single case. As
such, his system is clearly idiographic and falls very
much within the tradition of the classical clinical method
of inquiry. However, Horowitz' model attempts to bring a
new level of discipline and organization to the time-
honored method of the case study--a method which at times
can become wildly inferential and largely immune to
rigorous validation.
Another outstanding feature of Horowitz' model is
that it has taken on as its primary focus the very process
of change. Instead of relying on well-worn phrases like
"working through" or "strengthening of the ego"--phrases
which only tend to make the process even more
myster ious--Horowitz attempts to confront the issue
directly. Using an information processing perspective, he
attempts to schematize the transformation process on a
level that is concrete enough to be applied to the details
of the actual clinical interchange. Such specificity in
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detailing the process of change is an instructive refine-
ment to much of what passes as clinical theory.
Perhaps the most important limitation in Horowitz'
model is that it fails to fully account for the interac-
tional nature of the clinical situation. Horowitz is pri-
marily concerned with depicting changes in the patient and
devotes little attention to the therapist's half of the
therapeutic transaction. While he does not rule it out,
Horowitz seems resistant to fully explore what is behind
the therapist's interventions. They are simply treated,
linearly, as input into the patient's information pro-
cessing system. A truly interactional picture, however,
would carefully consider the therapist in terms of state,
image of relationship, and information processing.
In summary, the work of Carson, Langs, and
Horowitz all represent ambitious attempts to place some
conceptual order into what goes on in the clinical
situation. Carson most clearly articulates an interac-
tional framework for understanding the nature of influence
in the clinical process. His suggestion that the interac-
tional dynamics of the therapist-patient dyad; i.e., how
these two negotiate a "fit," lies at the core of my
thinking.
Langs pushes us to more seriously consider the
therapist's contribution to the course of the clinical
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process. He also suggests that we focus more attention on
the immediate communication matrix— the "adaptive
context"--in attempting to understand the meanings of
emerging clinical material. Both of these ideas are pro-
minent features in my own theoretical formulations.
Finally Horowitz' method of conf igurational analy-
sis systematically traces the impact of the clinical
interaction through a micro-analysis of patterns of the
patient's information-processing. This thoughtful attempt
to link patterns of interaction to patterns of cognition
is a key element in my own model of the therapeutic pro-
cess. In addition, Horowitz' single case micro-analytic
research methodology seems to offer the most promising
method of empirical validation.
The stage is now set to present my own ideas.
The parameters of the task have been clearly drawn. I
have put forth several basic orienting questions and an
assumptive framework with which they might be addressed.
I have also examined three other attempts to model the
psychotherapy process and have highlighted their most use-
ful components. What remains is to weave these strands
together into a coherent picture.
CHAPTER III
A GENERAL VIEW OF HUMAN FUNCTIONING
Any attempt at a meaningful understanding of
psychotherapy and the nature of change must be done within
a larger framework of how people function in the world.
If psychotherapy can indeed be seen as one type of human
experience, then it follows that the most compelling model
of clinical influence should be closely wedded to this
broader view of how people adapt and change. Thus, before
we get into the details of my model of psychotherapy, let
us first step back and discuss this wider theoretical con-
text.
This general view of human funct ioning pictures
people as be ing in a cont inuous proces s of adapt ing to
their environment. The manner in which people adapt to
their environment is based on how they process the raw
data of the ir experience . What is be ing sugges ted is that
there are a number of crucial intervening steps between
stimulus (i.e. , the environment) and response (i.e.
,
pat-
tern of adaptation) . This intervening internal processing
is, under ideal conditions, used to shape an individual's
perceptual
,
interpret ive , and response tendenci es into a
functional stance toward the world.
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Perhaps the most useful way to analyze this inter-
nal processing is to view it as being organized around a
number of distinct, but interrelated schemata. These
schemata are thematically focused information processing
routines which are employed to apprehend and respond to
the environment. We might view an individual's schemata
as that person's private neural library of soft-ware
packages. Any one (or combination) of them can be acti-
vated by a particular configuration of stimuli from both
the inside, in the form of mental input, and the outside,
in the form of environmental input. Once activated, these
schemata coordinate a pre-patterned set of perceptual,
interpretive, and response functions.
Our understanding of this notion can be further
refined in a number of ways. One of the most confusing
aspects of schemata is that they represent both a charac-
teristic patterning of activity and also a clearly iden-
tifiable cluster of informational content. Thus, a
schemata can be described not only in terms of the style
in which information is handled (such as "deliberately,"
"obsessively," "impulsively," "logically," etc.) but also
in terms of the assumptions (such as "the world is a
dangerous place," or "a smiling face means that a person
is likely to have friendly intentions") and input data
(such as "it is cold and I am hungry," or "the person just
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said hello to me). Seeing schemata as both activity and
informational content can make it an elusive concept.
Schemata can be differentiated both horizontally
and vertically. Horizontal differentiation involves
classifying these information processing routines in terms
of functionally and/or situationally specific themes. The
schemata "I am shopping for groceries" can be viewed as
horizontally distinct from "I am attending church."
Vertical differentiation involves distinguishing schemata
according to their relative level of generalizability
.
Lower order schemata are situationally and functionalLy
specific: "My next task at the grocery store is to pick
out some apples," or "I should now be singing the next
hymn of the church service." Higher order schemata can be
applied to a broader class of activities: "By grocery
shopping, I am trying to be a helpful husband," or "By
attending church, 1 am being a morally principled person."
What makes it especially difficult to talk about schemata
is that individuals adapt to their environment by simulta-
neously employing a number of them at a variety of levels.
It is important that these schemata be seen pri-
marily in terms of their adaptative function. This means
that their most important characteristic is their ability
to change in response to shifts in a person's experience
of the world. Another way of stating this is that sche-
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mata are empirically derived and not transcendental. They
are the result of an individual's interaction with others,
things, body parts, mental images, and so on. Thus, not
only do these schemata shape one's interpretation and
response to the world, but they are shaped by one's
experience to the world. The cognitive interface between
people and their environment is essentially an open system
of feedback loops.
CHAPTER IV
THE SELF- CONCEPT
One class of schemata that plays a particularly
important role in shaping ones interpretation and response
to the environment are self-schemata. Self
-schemata are
those routines of information processing that determine
our sense of who we are, how we are doing, and what is and
should be our place in the world. Self
-schemata play such
a prominent role in a human being's adaptive efforts that
I have chosen it to be the focus for my model of
psychotherapy influence. This is not to suggest that
significant change cannot involve other aspects of the
person-environment interface, but simply that self-
schemata appear to be the best candidates for constructing
a more circumscribed model of the process of therapeutic
change
.
We are now in a position to more productively
address the first orienting question: What exactly is
changed in psychotherapy? Drawing from this wider
theoretical context we can answer this question in the
most general sense. What gets changed in psychotherapy is
the way in which patients go about interpreting and
responding to (i.e., processing) the data of their
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experience. For our purposes, however, we will be
focussing on one aspect of this overall picture of this
cognitively based notion of adaptation. Using this more
narrow focus, what is changed in therapy is the way the
patient views him or herself; i.e., self schemata.
If changes in self-schemata are to be at the
center of our inquiry, it is important that we look more
closely at this concept. As alluded to earlier, the self-
schemata is not a single entity but more usefully can be
seen as a constellation of sub- schemata
. The particular
type of self-schemata that will be our primary concern
involves the sense of self as object. In other words, the
picture that people carry around of themselves-
-the ir
self-image. An especially helpful approach toward ana-
lyzing the self-concept has been put forward by Hewitt
(1984) from a symbolic interact ionist perspective. He
suggests that the self-image can be seen as self as object
and, as such, can be viewed from three analytically
distinguishable vantage points: Its location, in relation
to other selves (e.g., "I am a father to my daughter"),
its qualities and attributes as these are imagined by self
(e.g., "I am a caring father") and the evaluations made of
the self as object (e.g., "I value the fact that I am a
caring father"). Hewitt further suggests that such
descriptions of self can be "situated" (i.e., limited to a
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specific situation) or "biographical" (i.e., enduring).
His method of analyzing the self concept corresponds to my
method of understanding schemata, in general, along hori-
zontal and vertical dimensions. Jumping to the thera-
peutic situation, it is clear that Hewitt's breakdown
offers us a convenient method to organize our view of cli-
nical influence.
Having designated the self-image as our focus, we
can begin to think more carefully about how people go
about constructing and modifying the various components
which make up the overall view of self. This is an
important question because it pushes our thinking in the
direction of psychotherapy and the process of change. In
addressing this issue, I have again drawn heavily from the
perspective of the symbolic interact ionists
.
People construct images of themselves based on
their interaction with the environment. It is from the
data of one's experience that an individual fashions a
picture of self. Some experiences are explicit in the
way they affect a person's self image (e.g., receiving a
report card, getting praise). Most experiences, however,
do not have such direct implications. These experiences
exert their influence by being part of a larger pattern of
experience which, in turn, can generate meanings that can
alter one's self-image.
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This raises a very important distinction. While
it is true that one's sense of self is based on one's
interactions with the environment, there is perhaps a more
useful way to look at this process. It is the meanings
that are assigned to one's experience of the world that
are really the key to shaping one's image of self. What
this suggests is that the phenomenology of one's
experience of the world lies at the heart of creating a
self-image. The notions of "meaning making," "perceptual
set," and "interpretive activity" take on special impor-
tance in this light. If we are to understand how
experience generates self-images we must first look at how
an individual makes sense of that experience.
This perspective
,
unfortunately, introduces
another source of complexity and ambiguity. This
interpretive activity, like every other aspect of our
cognitive apparatus, is molded by our interaction with the
environment. This creates a situation where the very
activity which shapes the way in which we take in our
experience of the world, is simultaneously being altered
by that experience
. In this state of mutual flux , it
becomes extremely difficult to grab onto and hold
meanings , for they are continuous ly shifting . Thus , we
can eas ily find ourselves caught in a series of maddening
recurs ive loops . The only way to escape these loops is to
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strategically limit one's field of vision so that one is
still able to capture the flavor of the phenomena yet does
not get lost in its unresolvable intricacies. Perhaps the
most difficult part of exploring this topic and developing
a coherent model has been to know how to set these limits.
Now that we have considered, in a general way,
what goes into shaping an individual's self-concept 1
, the
stage is set to consider how psychotherapy, in particular,
can shape an individual's sense of self. However, before
we begin that task (which, incidentally, is this Master's
thesis' primary purpose) we have one more preliminary
issue to address. It is an important issue because it
forces us to answer directly the question of why we have
chosen to focus all of our attention on the self-image.
If our primary interest lies in understanding how
psychotherapy can alter a patient's way of adapting to the
world, then the justification for spending so much effort
looking at the self-concept lies in our ability to con-
vincingly establish the link between a person's self-
concept and his or her pattern of responding to the world.
What follows are various ways to try to conceptualize that
1 ink.
1 In this paper, I am using the terms self-image
and self-concept interchangeably. Both are used to
designate the constellation of mental images that one has
of oneself.
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One way in viewing the Link between self-image and
behavior is that self-images are an important part of the
way in which individuals make sense of their world. Self-
images serve as powerful filters in the effort to derive
meaning from experience. It is largely on the basis of
these meanings that individuals respond to their environ-
ment. For example, if a person goes into a situation with
a particular self-image prominent in his mind, he will
unavoidably be sensitized toward viewing the situation in
ways that confirm this self-image. This reaffirmed sense
of self will, in turn, affect the way he behaves in that
s ituation
.
Self-images are involved in more than just this
interpretative function. They also serve to define one's
role in any given situation. This role serves as a power-
ful guide to behavior. For example, if I see myself as a
student there are certain rules of conduct which go along
with being a student. The term role is used here rather
loosely. It can refer to something as rigid and rule-
prescribed as "the goalie on the hockey team" or to
something as vague and personally idiosyncratic as "a good
friend." The important point is that one's self-image
provides important information about how one should act if
one wishes to fulfill a designated role.
Self-images also shape our patterns of motivation.
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If we assume that self-images always exist alongside
idealized images of self, then the way in which these two
images match up to each other can greatly influence how an
individual directs his or her behavior. From this
perspective, images of self (both "actual" and
"idealized") play a crucial role in shaping what the sym-
bolic interactionist have called our "plans of action."
Thus, if human behavior is to be understood in terms of
intentionality
,
the tension between the actual and
idealized self-image lies at the core of such
understanding. For example, if one feels destined to be,
let's say, a great piano player, this image of self will
have an enormous influence on shaping the person's long
range behavioral goals and, by extension, shape the more
immediate plans of action that are employed on a day to
day or even moment to moment basis.
Our final way of understanding this link utilizes
Horowitz' notion of "states." People's behavior can be
understood as arising out of a limited number of recurrent
states. These states are defined as organized constella-
tions of emotional, perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral
responses which form a coordinated and identifiable
gestalt. We often label these states as moods. The
states in which one finds oneself are determined by a
number of factors, including one's physiological status
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(e.g., how hungry, tired or drugged a person is), the
social environment (e.g., whether one is with trusted
friends vs. about to go to a job interview), environmen-
tal factors (e.g., how hot and uncomfortable it is) and
cognitive-affective factors (e.g., how worried one is).
It is the character of the mix of these factors which
serves as the gating mechanism determining the choice of
state. One of the most important variables affecting thi
gating apparatus is the person's current image of self.
It is on the basis of this mix of factors that a
particular state is activated. Individuals settle into
particular states through a gating mechanism that selec-
tively allows one state, out of the many possible, to be
activated. What is especially significant about this
gating process is that it is very sensitive to an
individual's current image of self. In other words, one'
self-image plays an important role in determining which
state is "let through." Once a certain state is acti-
vated, one is primed to interact with the environment in
particular style. Thus, through the intervening variable
of "state" we can see how self-image can influence beha-
vior .
PART TWO
TOWARD A MODEL OF PSYCHOTHERAPY
PROCESS AND CHANGE
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With this more general theoretical context as a
backdrop, we can become more specific. The focus is now
an identifying exactly how the therapeutic interaction
influences the patient's self-concept. The discussion
begins by describing three different ways of understanding
the process of therapeutic influence. We should stress
here that while this division imposes a certain amount of
order on the phenomenon, it also conveys a false sense of
compartmentalization. Therapeutic influence involves a
seamless blend of these three, and probably other, pro-
cesses
.
It should be noted that a great deal more space is
devoted to pursuing the implications of the third channel
of influence. There are some important reasons for this.
One of the initial goals of this project was to articulate
a model of therapy process and the nature of change from
an interactional perspective. The emphasis on the third
channel of inf luence- -which stresses the importance of the
therapeutic interact ion- -reflect s that bias. However, in
the course of developing my ideas around the question of
how psychotherapy changes patients' self-images it became
clear that there were other ways to look at this process.
My discussion of the first two channels of influence is a
modest attempt to acknowledge this fact.
CHAPTER V
THREE CHANNELS OF THERAPEUTIC INFLUENCE
Channel #1 - Direct Intervention
This firs t channel acknowledges the importance of
a therapist's direct attempt to influence a patient's
self-image. By verbally sharing an understanding of the
patient's behavior, thoughts, feelings, current situation,
and history, a therapist can offer new ways for a patient
to view self. In using this channel of influence, a
therapist is, in effect, asking a patient to look at
things his or her own way. For example
, ins tead of
under s tand ing a pat ient 1 s failed relationship as an inca-
pacity for intimacy , a the rap is t might ref rame it as a
necessary but painful step towards self-different iat ion
and maturat ion . Or
,
perhaps , ins tead of seeing a
patient's missed sess ion as be ing an ind icat ion of
irresponsibility it might be ins tead seen as the pat ient f s
desire to protect the therapist from what is believed to
be destructive anger.
.
In ins ight oriented therapy such intervent ions
would be called " interpretat ions , " while in the vocabulary
of the family therapists, they might be labelled
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"reframes". In fact, a number of schools of psycho-
therapy, including psychoanalysis and psy choanalyt ical ly-
oriented psychotherapy, certain family and strategic
therapies, and the cognitive therapies use this as their
primary therapeutic tool. In effect, all of these
approaches revolve around explicit efforts to influence
the patient's manner of seeing the world by verbally
offering new meanings. What distinguishes this channel of
influence from the two which are to follow is that these
meanings are communicated in a direct form. This mode of
influence can be analyzed by looking at the verbal content
of a therapy session.
Again using Hewitt's (1984) three dimensional ana-
lysis of the self-concept, we can break down a therapist's
interpretations about the patient's self-image into the
same categories. Thus, the therapist's comments can be
directed, at one level, at defining the patient's role or
identity. For example, the comments: "You always seem to
be the caretaker," "It's hard to handle all of the
pressures of an independent, young adult" are instances
where the patient's self is being defined in terms of
social location. Therapists comments rarely stop at this
point. They usually are also directed at identifying cer-
tain qualities or traits in the individual: "There is a
part of you that would really like to be taken care of" or
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"It is difficult for you to assert the power you have."
As these two examples suggest, the message about the
qualities of the person are often only implied by the
statement. While there are many instances where a thera-
pist will directly describe a quality in the patient, the
usual approach is less direct. Finally, a therapist's
interpretation may also convey an evaluative or emotional
dimension as well: "You talk as though you're sensitivity
is a liability, I don't see it that way" or "I am
impressed with how well you are making it through this
difficult period." According to most models of clinical
technique, therapists are discouraged to share emotional
reactions or to offer value judgements. Therefore, this
type of direct message about the patient's self-concept is
probably the least common of the three. However, when it
comes to the therapist's indirect analogic, communication
about the patient (i.e. channel #2) the emotional and eva-
luative dimension is probably the most prominent.
Once again, the intention here is not to explore
this avenue of therapeutic influence in any great depth.
This channel- -that is, direct efforts to change the
patient's view of self --has gotten more than its fair
share of attention in the thinking of clinical theorists.
In fact, it is probably at the core of most clinical
theories where meaning and insight play a role. The point
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here is to briefly acknowledge the usefulness of this more
traditional perspective while keeping our focus primarily
on a more interactional perspective. But the important
message should be that the data out of which a patient can
refashion an image of self can come in many different
forms
.
Channel #2 - Analogic Self Messages
This second channel of therapeutic influence
stresses the importance of the therapist's interactional
posture in shaping the patient's sense of self. The con-
cern here is on the analogic communication of the
therapis t--communication made up of messages that are
embedded, often unconsciously, in the interactional stance
of the therapist. The key to understanding this view of
clinical influence is the symbolic interactionist notion
that people arrive at a sense of who they are based on the
responses of those around them. More precisely, indivi-
duals develop an image of themselves based on their
inference of how others see them.
Both channels #1 and #2 stress the importance of
the therapist's working image of the patient in
influencing the patient's self-concept. However, in the
first, this working image is conveyed directly in the form
of therapeutic understanding and/or reframing. In the
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second, this process is much less direct, involving mes-
sages that are only implied by the interactional behavior
of the therapist.
Robert Langs (1982), from a psychoanalytic
perspective, alludes to this distinction when he iden-
tifies two separate avenues of cure in the therapeutic
process. His first avenue of cure which involves "the
achievement of affectively meaningful, valid cognitive
insights" (p. 128) roughly correspond to our first channel
of influence. The second avenue of cure which he des-
cribes as "one that is object relational and interactional
involving unconscious ident if icatory processes" (p. 128)
mirrors, in many important ways, this second model of
inf luence
.
In discussing this second model of influence, both
Langs and myself stress the power of the analogic com-
munication embedded in the therapist's interactional
stance. In addition, we both emphasize that much of
this communication is done outside of the therapist's
conscious intentions and control. Langs' use of the term
" ident if icatory process," however, refers to much more
than what is being described here. Langs' term refers to
all of the different ways that a patient's internal world
is modified by one's effort to be like (i.e., to "identify
with") an external object. The emphasis here, in con-
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trast, is on a specific aspect of Lang's broader concep-
tion of the identification process. We are concerned with
the patient's incorporation of the therapist working image
of the patient.
Perhaps the following outline of the basic units
of the therapeutic exchange helps to clarify this process:
1) The objective behavior of the therapist
2) Based on this behavior (and a host of other
contextual and cognitive factors)
, the
patient develops a sense of the therapist's
interactional posture.
3) Based on the perceived interactional stance
of the therapist, the patient infers how
the therapist views the patient.
4) The patient's sense of how the therapist
views the patients can, under certain con-
ditions, bring about meaningful changes in
the patient's view of self.
The remainder of our discussion of channel #2
revolves around the following question: How can we best
understand the process by which a patient makes inferences
about how the therapist "sees" the patient? In terms of
the above outline, our concern will be on clarifying how
step #3 comes about. The issue of change, step #4 in the
outline, will not be considered in this section but will
be considered in greater detail in a later chapter.
The key to answering the above question is to more
precisely develop an understanding of the notion "the per-
ceived interactional posture of the therapist." This term
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refers to how the patient perceives the therapist to be
positioning him or herself in the therapeutic rela-
tionship. This perception of the therapist's interac-
tional stance is rarely a single well defined cognitive
entity, but is more likely to be experienced as a multi-
faceted flow of conscious and unconscious impressions. In
the following passage, I describe how a patient might go
about making sense of a therapist's interactional stance.
This example is based on an actual case that I saw several
years ago. This description is what I believed to be this
patient's view of my interactional stance midway through
the fifth session of a ten session brief therapy. It
corresponds to a section of the session in which the
patient has been relatively active and I have been pri-
marily silent.
The patient sees the therapist as a suppor-
tive audience to his attempt to make sense of
his problems. He interprets the therapist's
silence as an invitation, and perhaps even a
mild demand, to take on the role of the "good"
patient—working hard to share his problematic
feelings and to figure out a way to overcome
them. He also sees the therapist as a potential
source of wisdom who, if given enough data, may
be able to offer a way to solve his problems.
In a related manner, the therapist is seen as a
potential source of comfort who, if shown enough
pain, will offer a soothing pallative to the
patient's difficulties.
Such an image of the therapist--as a poten-
tial but relatively inactive source of wisdom
and comfort may provoke several other, deeper
images of the therapist; a withholding, and
uncaring caretaker, or, alternatively, an inade-
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quate or disabled caretaker. In either case,the task of the patient is to bring out thepositive but currently unavailable qualities inthe therapist. Finally, the patient also viewsthe therapist as a demanding critic, harshly
evaluating his performance as a therapy patientThe regular stumbles in his speech are indi-
cative of his effort to edit and polish his pre-
sentation. ^
It is clear from this above description that a
patient's sense of the therapist's interactional stance is
likely to be a complex constellation of intertwining and
shifting mental images. Moreover, any effort to charac-
terize this collection of impressions must necessarily
utilize a great deal of inference. This leads to a cer-
tain amount of unavoidable inde term inancy when it comes to
defining the patient's sense of the therapist's interac-
tional stance. It should also be stressed that these
impressions are based on patterns of experience rather
than on the discreet elements that make up those patterns.
Thus, it may be impossible to link any of these
impressions of the therapist directly to any one piece of
interactional data. As slippery as this notion is,
however, it is indispens ible in understanding this avenue
of therapeutic influence. For it is out of this sense of
the therapist that powerful messages about the patient's
self emerge.
What emerges from this composite picture of the
therapist's interactional stance is the therapist's
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"working image" of the patient. This corresponds to step
#3 in the above outline. Another way of putting this step
is that patients infer how they are seen by their thera-
pists based on how they see their therapists acting toward
them. For example, consider the therapist who is seen as
taking an attentive, respectful, but non- intrus ive stance
to a patient's attempt to struggle with an issue. One set
of meanings that might accompany this interactional stance
is that the therapist is seen as having an image of the
patient of being well equipped to independently cope.
This may set the stage for some meaningful shifts in how
the patient views him or her self.
Channel #3 - The Therapeutic Relationship
Our third and final approach toward understanding
the nature of therapeutic influence is based on the notion
that people construct images of themselves by turning
themselves into what the symbolic interact ionis ts have
termed an "object". In other words, individuals are con-
tinously stepping outside of their actions in order to
gain some sense of who they are. Applying this idea to
the clinical situation, we might say that an important
aspect of the transformation process in psychotherapy
involves providing an experience—the therapeutic
relat ionship--that challenges the patient's self concept.
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In the course of interacting with the therapist, the
patient finds himself acting in ways which disconfirm old
notions of self. It follows, then, that the crucial
therapeutic tactic, is for the therapist to take on a
posture that forces the patient to adopt an atypical pat-
tern of interaction. It is only after being pushed into a
new way of relating that the patient has the experiential
basis for seeing him or herself in a new way.
For example, consider the male patient who carries
around an image of himself as dependent and incompetent.
Out of this self-concept comes a pattern of behavior which
invites others to offer confirmatory responses. Thus,
this patient is likely to be caught in a social matrix
where he typically relinquishes control and lets others
take care of him. However, if this patient were to be
engaged in a relationship where such an interactional
style was not met with a complementary response (i.e., the
patient is not automatically taken care of) , the patient
might be forced to shift his style of social engagement
and exert more initiative. If this shift in relational
style is appropriately encouraged, the patient may begin
to experience himself as being more competent and self-
directed. This new kind of interactional experience can
be the basis for revising old assumptions about who he is
and what he is capable of doing.
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If people arrive at images of themselves based on
the nature of their interpersonal relationships, an
obvious preliminary question to ask is how do these rela-
tionships take on their particular nature in the first
place. In other words, if we want to understand how rela-
tionships foster change we have to step back a bit and
first understand the process by which a relationship takes
on a particular direction and pattern. Developing a
framework for understanding the pragmatics ol the thera-
peutic interaction, i.e., how the therapeutic interaction
takes on its particular shape, will be the focus of the
following chapter.
CHAPTER VI
THE PRAGMATICS OF THE THERAPEUTIC INTERACTION
The Interactional-Cognitive Stance
This approach to understanding the pragmatics of
the clinical relationship has a cognitive emphasis. In
other words, patient and therapist interactional behavior
can best be seen as being guided by mental events. The
real challenge at this point is to develop some conceptual
tools that will enable us to characterize these mental
events, and, in turn, trace the "logic" of how an interac-
tion unfolds. The key to this effort involves what I have
termed the "interactional-cognitive stance". The assump-
tion behind this core notion is that every piece of
interactional behavior can ultimately be explained as
emerging from a set of cognitions. How an individual
engages in a relationship is determined by the make-up of
this interact ional- cognitive stance
.
The image that bes t captures this not ion is that
of an ever-chang ing three- d imens ional j ig-saw puz z le of
interlocking information process ing clusters that are
constantly interacting with each other and with the
environment. This communication is done via input
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routines with perceptual and interpretive functions and
output routines whose functions are to generate plans of
action. Thus, the therapeutic relationship can be viewed
in terras of how the therapist's and patient's respective
interactional-cognitive stances come to generate par-
ticular behaviors and how these interactional-cognitive
stances are, in turn, continuously shaped by each
participant's experience of the unfolding interaction.
The following diagram (Figure I) might be helpful in
illustrating the back and forth nature of this process.
Thus, the therapeutic interaction can be viewed as
the back and forth exchange of interactional behaviors
that constantly shape the interactional-cognitive stance
of each participant. Each new stance is, in turn, the
basis for another exchange. This diagram fails, however,
to refine our understanding of what exactly are these
interactional-cognitive stances. What follows is an
extensive examination of this all- important concept. The
discussion is broken into seven sections, each one
describing in detail a different component of the overall
interactional-cognitive stance.
A word of caution is in order. There is a danger
in discussing the notion of the "interactional-cognitive
stance" in terms of organized and discrete components.
The problem is that this constellation of cognitions does
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not lend itself to tight compartmentalizat ion
. The term
interactional-cognitive stance is used to designate an
ever-changing net of meanings which actually depend on
their complex intermingling in order to maintain their
functional integrity and do not exist as separate enti-
ties. Therefore, the following attempt to identify and
analyze the various components to this interactional-
cognitive stance is admittedly artificial and is presented
primarily for the sake of keeping the discussion
manageable. We must remember that the organization of
our discussion is not meant to mirror the way the
interactional-cognitive stance exists out there.
1 ) Working Image of the Other
The phrase "working image of the other" refers to
the collection of mental representations of the other that
guide interactional behavior. How one chooses to respond
to an individual is influenced, to a great extent, by how
we see, both consciously and unconsciously, that indivi-
dual. There are a variety of different ways in which a
person "sees" an interactional partner.
In the most straightforward sense, these mental
images correspond to the perceived qualities and attribu-
tes that go into one's general enduring sense of the
other. If asked to describe a person, this is a set of
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cognitions that one would rely upon. It is important to
note that the way one goes about constructing this image
of the other is loaded with bias. People invariably see
those around them in terms of existing cognitive schemata.
In psychoanalytic psychotherapy this process of distortion
has been labelled transference or countertrans ference
,
depending on who is doing the distorting.
People also view their interactional partners in
terms of transitory states (see Chapter IV for a previous
discussion of this concept). For example, in addition to
seeing a patient in terms of enduring qualities (i.e.,
obsessive, borderline, high-achiever, etc.), a therapist
can also see the patient in terms of the temporary style
in which he or she is processing and engaging the world
(i.e., anxious, angry, pre-occupied
,
defensive, etc.).
People also assess others in terms of their
interactional stance. By interactional stance we are
referring to how an individual has positioned him or her-
self in the relationship. Knowing another's stance allows
one to predict that person's future emotional and beha-
vioral responses. These predictions can serve as one's
guide in the relationship.
Closely related to this cluster of mental repre-
sentations is an individual's sense of the interpersonal
pressure of the other. What is being highlighted here is
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how people are continuously interpreting the behavior of
others in terms of what is being asked of them. For
example, a therapist may experience a patient's repeated
phrase, "Do you know what I mean?" as a demand for (among
many other possibilities) undifferentiated fusion. Out
of the many impressions that go into making up one's
working image of the other, this kind, in particular,
calls out for a particular behavioral response.
Another important feature of this composite image
(which, unfortunately, is unavoidably awkward to put into
sentence form) involves an individual's sense of how the
other person sees him or herself. This is the inference
of how one is seen through the eyes of another. In cer-
tain situations, this can be the most important piece of
information about how one should act. If a person has a
strong need to confirm another person's view of who he or
she is, then this individual is obligated to conform to
the expectations that accompany such an image. For
example, if a patient senses the therapist sees him as a
sensitive and caring person he will have to behave in cer-
tain ways in therapy if he wishes to conform to the per-
ceived expectations of the therapist.
Individuals also evaluate others in terms of their
potential interpersonal resources. People are always
gauging, both correctly and incorrectly, what the other
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person has available to offer. In psychotherapy, patients
see their therapists as providers of a variety of resour-
ces including emotional support, advice, insight, and a
number of other, more idiosyncratic things (like forgive-
ness, admiration, punishment). What the therapist is per-
ceived as "having," will partly determine the approach
that a patient will take towards the therapist.
People appraise their interactional partners in
terms of relative status. This can be determined along a
variety of dimensions, including age, education, economic
status, sex, ethnicity, and physical attributes. This is
especially important in terms of one's sense of who has
the power and control in a relationship. As will be
discussed in the next chapter, therapeutic leverage is
often directly related to the patient's attribution of
power to the therapist.
An important aspect of developing a sense of
another is by getting an idea of how they are reacting to
one's behavior. Toward this end, people are constantly
monitoring their interactional partners ongoing reactions
in order to decide where one wishes to go in the interac-
tion. In a sense, an individual's "working image of the
other" is changing from moment to moment as a result of
this feedback. In psychotherapy, patients are invariably
cued by the rap is ts as to whether they should pursue the ir
73
current track. For example, the reason a patient talks at
such length about, let's say, his mother, may be more a
function of the reinforcing responses (including attentive
nods to continue) of the therapist than of any deep need
on the part of the patient.
2) Working Image of Self
Another group of cognitions that figure promi-
nently in how a person responds to another are those that
are related to the person's view of self. Out of the
loosely knit network of self-images emerges a sense of
what one can, should, and wishes to do. In the previous
section, the emphasis was on how the view of the other
shapes behavior. In this section, the focus is on how the
view (or more precisely, views) of self guide one's beha-
vior.
At the center of this constellation of self-
thoughts and self-feelings is, of course, one's working
image of self. The term which perhaps best captures this
cluster of cognitions is "identity." This is the sense of
who one is, in terms of descriptive qualities, (handsome,
witty, stupid, likable, etc.), in terms of acknowledged
capabilities .(e.g. I'm a good caretaker, I am a poor
public speaker, I am a good athlete, etc.), and in terms
of how one evaluates one ' s qualities (e.g. I dislike being
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overweight, I like my ability to work hard) or how one
evaluates one's self as a whole (e.g. I am basically an
incompetent person, I am a worthwhile person).
For example, the extremely depressed patient who
finds it difficult to talk about him or her self in
therapy, may be operating from a global, and irrationally
exaggerated, negative evaluation of self. Such an image
of self would make the patient feel painfully ashamed to
share any bit of him or her self. While it is possible
that a single rigidly constructed working image of self
may dominate one's interactional-cognitive stance
regardless of the situation, it is much more common (and
probably healthier) that a variety of working images are
potentially available to a person, depending on the stimu-
lus properties of his or her current situation.
Thus, the emergence of any particular working
image of self is in most cases, a transitory
s ituat ionally-dependent phenomenon. However, it should be
stressed that for any individual certain images of self
tend to come to the fore with more regularity. These are
the self-images that one is most likely to use in
describing his or her identity.
A very important component of one's working image
of self has to do with the person's appraisal of his or
her interactional needs. A person looks at his or her
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self and determines what still requires some attention.
What we are suggesting here is that things like drives,
needs, motivation, and all the rest of those things that
allegedly "push" an individual to engage in certain kinds
of interactions are really mediated by these cognitive
self-appraisals. If we return to our original notion of
how the working image of self is generated this picture
becomes clearer. People are continuously monitoring them-
selves in order to establish some sense of who they are
and how they are doing. This monitoring process keeps
track of the totality of the person's experience,
including one's perceptions, thoughts, feeling, states,
and physical condition. A person's needs, interactional
and otherwise, are included in this process. This results
in a continuously updated image of self that includes,
among many other things, a cognitive appraisal of one's
interactional needs. This cluster of cognitions about
oneself is extremely important in shaping one's subsequent
interactional behavior.
Another way of thinking about how people construct
images of themselves involves the notion of role taking.
Roles are well defined situational identities that not
only provide a way to label and view oneself, but, more
importantly, offer a person an established code of con-
duct. By accepting a role, a person has implicitly
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contracted to follow a set of guidelines about how one
should be in the world. Role-taking is essentially a way
of defining oneself in terms of a behavioral niche that
has been sanctioned and defined by the larger social con-
text. One has, in a sense, turned to the outside social
environment--the culture--for help in defining who one
is. This is in contrast to the mechanism of self-
definition just previously discussed which involved a much
more personalized and idiosyncratic avenue for generating
a self-concept based on one's own observation and
appraisals of self.
In the case of well defined and highly institu-
tionalized roles, the guidelines are explicit, detailed,
and can cover almost every conceivable situation. In the
case of a less defined role, like the role of a
psychotherapy patient, there is much more room for ambi-
guity and confusion. Thus, roles differ widely in their
ability to provide specific behavior guidance across a
number of interactional situations.
In psychotherapy, a very powerful but
underacknowledged explanation for both patient and thera-
pist behavior involves this phenomenon of role taking.
Patient and therapist act the way they do based on their
image of what they believe to be the behavioral
"requirements" of their respective roles.
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In spite of adopting the same role, two people may
choose to act quite differently because they each have a
different interpretation of how the role should be
enacted. Again, these differences are likely to be much
greater for roles which are less precisely defined by the
larger social environment. Patients and therapists can
easily come to the clinical situation with widely
diverging views of what their respective roles should be.
This partially explains why psychotherapy relationships
can vary so greatly.
A person's view of self, and the behavior that
arises out of that view, is also influenced by the
appraisal of one's place in his or her relational context.
People define themselves in terms of their relationships.
What distinguishes this kind of role-taking from the more
general kind of role-taking just discussed is that the
emphasis here is not on defining oneself in terms of a
socially-created niche but in terms of how one is fitting
together with another person. Establishing a sense of
where one stands in a relationship determines, to a great
extent, how one chooses to interact with that individual.
Thus, a patient responds to a highly esteemed therapist
with a great deal of deference because of the patient's
sense of who he or she is in relation to the therapist.
A persons' situational identity is not always
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clearcut and can be influenced by the nuances of the
immediate interactional context. The patient who sees him-
self as an unwanted load on a seemingly uninterested
and over-burdened therapist may abruptly change that view
if the therapist begins to respond in a way that suggests
real interest and concern. It follows, then, that a
person's sense of self-in- the-relat ionship is far from
fixed and can, in fact, be quite volatile.
How easily the image of one's self- in- the-
relat ionship can be dislodged is partially a function of
the relationship's history. If the pattern of the
interaction has been relatively stable over a period of
time it is much more likely (for better or worse) that the
accompanying view of the self- in- the-relat ionship will
also be firmly entrenched. This explains how ongoing
stable relationships, including those in therapy, are so
resistant to change. Even if one participant decides to
start responding differently, these images of self are
likely to remain fixed and, as a consequence, the behavior
that they generate will persist in spite of a shift in the
immediate interactional context.
A very important type of self cognition has
nothing to do with how a person actually sees him or her-
self. These images of self, instead, correspond to what
the person would ideally like to be. Together they
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comprise what might be called the person's "ideal self".
This constellation of self-images is extremely important
in shaping a person's behavior, especially in a context
like therapy, where the goal for many is self- improvement
(i.e., the moving toward this ideal self).
Much of the patient's dissatisfaction and motiva-
tion in therapy can be understood in terms of the tension
between the current appraisal of his or her "real" self
and his or her ideal self. A patient's behavior both in
and out of therapy, becomes much more understandable when
we consider it as an attempt (often misguided,
unfortunately) to close the gap between these two images
of self. For example, the depressed patient who obsesses
over his inability to be "happy" may be laboring under the
impression that, ideally, one should be happy. His beha-
vior in therapy reflects the striving for this self-ideal.
The question of how this "ideal self" is generated
or modified is an extremely complex one which cannot be
comprehensively addressed here. However, one important
point should be made in this regard. Images of an "ideal
self" are not immutably fixed and are, under certain cir-
cumstances, amenable to change. Perhaps the most impor-
tant junctures in an individual's development involves
modification in the image of this ideal self. Signficant
relationships with influential and respected others are
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very Likely to be central in altering these important
inner ideals. The experience of psychotherapy is poten-
tially one such experience. Thus, a patient's ideal self
not only guides his or her interaction in therapy but, in
some case, is modified by the experience of the therapy as
well
.
Not only is a person's behavior guided by an
"ideal self" but it is also propelled by what I have
termed the " to-be- shared- self " . The "to-be-shared-self " is
essentially the picture that a person wishes to convey
(i.e., share) about him or her self. It corresponds to
those aspects of one's self-image that one hopes to
reveal. Much of human interactional behavior can be
understood in these terms. People engage in behaviors
that, among many other things, selectively project certain
aspects of themselves. This is certainly true in
psychotherapy. The way in which a patient talks about him
or herself invariably carries a crucial message
(communicated in varying degrees of explicitness) about
what exactly the patient wants to be known and understood
about himself. This inner image of the "to-be-shared-self"
is what directs, at least on one level, the patient's com-
munication
.
This "to-be-shared-self" may or may not have
anything to do with the person's sense of his or her real
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self. In a defensive posture, an individual is most
likely to attempt to convey an image of self that is
false. However, in an emotionally safe situation, one may
try to convey what he or she feels to be his real self.
Thus, the task of understanding interactional behavior
using the concept of the "to-be-shared-self" is doubly
complicated. Not only must one ascertain the nature of the
self images that are trying to be conveyed but one must
also ascertain whether these images are real (i.e. non-
defensively motivated) or not.
Simply identifying the to-be-shared-self that lies
behind any piece of interaction behavior is not enough for
a complete understanding of that behavior. A full
explanation requires that we understand why such an image
of self was chosen to be conveyed in the first place. In
other words, conveying a particular image of self is only
a means to a more basic interactional end. A truly
complete analysis would include an attempt to identify
this underlying motivation.
3) Image of the Relationship
In the course of interacting with others, people
continuously develop inner maps of their relationships.
These inner representations play a central role in shaping
the interactional-cognitive stance out of which behavior
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emerges. The task here is to tease apart what goes into
these images. What emerges is how complex the seemingly
simple notion of "image of the relationship" can turn out
to be
.
At the most obvious level, individuals are guided
by their sense of the relationship's social identity. Once
a person identifies him or herself as being engaged in a
certain kind of relationship (e.g. " a business
transaction," "singles bar conversation," "family re-union
talk," or "psychotherapy") one must follow a set of beha-
vioral parameters if one wishes to stay appropriate.
Simply knowing the label that someone attaches to a par-
ticular interaction is only a starting point. We must also
ascertain the kinds of behavioral expectations and
constraints that such a person attaches to such a label.
This notion is actually very close to our pre-
viously discussed idea of role-taking. The difference is
that what is being defined in this case is the identity
and proper functioning of a two person interactional
system. Of course, what emerges from this relational iden-
tity is that each individual is given a role through which
he or she can help maintain the integrity of the entire
system.
Not only do people identify their relationship in
terms provided by the larger social context (e.g. "dating
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behavior," "bus-stop interaction,"
"teacher-pupil
relationship," etc.) but they also view their rela-
tionships in much more individualized ways. What we are
referring to here is an individual's more personalized
sense of a relationship. This involves the complex, and
often highly idiosyncratic, mixture of images that come to
represent one's view of a relationship. Two examples of
how one might sense a relationship include:
1 ) "Our relationship was playfully competitive and was
supported by a large amount of mutual respect" or,
2) "Our relationship was superficially cordial, although
there has been very little effort to develop a genuine
rapport .
"
Out of the " sense of the relationship" emerges a
set of expectations, usually unstated, about how one
should conduct oneself in the relationship. The reason why
relationships have continuity and what might be called
inertia is part ly because people interact accord ing to
these rather stable images
. Thus , the patient who views
his relationship with a therapist as one where he can
openly share his thoughts and feelings, is very likely to
s tructure his behavior around this working image of the
relationship
.
Closely attached to this individualized image of
the relationship is the person's evaluation of the rela-
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tionship. People are continuously passing judgements and
reacting emotionally to the kinds of relationships they
develop. Put another way, people react to their views of
an interaction along a positive-negative continuum; a per-
son likes or dislikes, to varying degrees, the nature of
the relationship.
This evaluative dimension plays a very important
role in shaping a person's overall stance in a rela-
tionship. At the most straightforward level (which is cer-
tainly not always the case) , a person is more likely to
engage in behaviors which attempt to maintain the present
course of a relationship if the relationship is viewed in
positive terms. More commonly, however, the link between
these evaluative responses and a course of behavior is
less direct and mediated by a host of complicating fac-
tors. For example, a common occurrence in therapy is a
great deal of ambivalence about the dependence that is
built into the therapeutic situation. On one level, the
support feels good and is gratifying but on another level,
the thought of seeing oneself in such a dependent rela-
tionship can evoke images of immaturity, weakness, and
even dangerous vulnerability. It is only in response to a
complex (and perhaps painful) mingling of these dievergent
evaluations that one decides on a course of action.
Just as one has an ideal self, one also has images
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of the ideal relationship. People have implicit images of
what form the various relationships of their life should
take. These images form the backdrop of not only how. one
goes about evaluating one's relationships but also play
an important role in guiding one's interactional behavior.
A father relates to his daughter, in part, based on an
image of what he feels to be an ideal father-daughter
relationship. The tension one feels when a relationship
does not feel right is partially the result of the discre-
pancy of one's view of the actual relationship and the
image of what one ideally wishes the relationship to be
like. Because such images usually go unart iculated and
unexamined, their influence can be deceptively powerful.
An extremely important feature of one's interac-
tion cognitive stance involves the assessment of the imme-
diate interactional context. This is the constantly
shifting sense that one has of an interaction. This image
of the interactional context can be influenced by
something as prominent as an impending separation or as
minute as subtle shift in one interactant ' s facial
features. Our understanding of interactional behavior
tends to overlook context at this level. Interaction is
largely explained in terms of the enduring images or, when
context is considered, only at the most macroscopic
levels . What is often overlooked is how every moment of
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an interaction can provide a powerful new context for
directing each interac tant
' s behavior.
Part of the reason why this component of an indi-
vidual interactional stance is so often overlooked is that
we tend not to think, and remember, our relationships in
such microscopic terms. Our sense of the immediate
interactive context is happening so quickly that we depend
on it almost reflexively and rarely keep track of it on a
conscious level. It would probably get in our way if we
were to become overly self-conscious about it. However, if
we were to freeze an interaction for a closer inspection,
we would find that the direction of the interaction is
powerfully shaped by the immediate context, a context
whose features are usually immediately forgotton or
ignored in our retrospective efforts to make sense of the
interac t ion
.
This sense of the status of the relationship is
related but distinct from the feedback that one is
constantly getting from the other participant in the
interaction. The emphasis here is on the immediate rela-
tional context, not on the ongoing sense of the other.
For example, patients often behave quite differently after
a session is formally "over" and are being escorted out of
the office. In this case, the patient's sense in a shift
in the interactional context (i.e., "the session is over")
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is largely responsible for the shift in behavior. A much
more subtle shift may be the result of a slight shift
in posture of many therapists who regularly become more
active in the latter part of their sessions. This shift
in posture is interpreted by the patient that the session
has reached the stage where the therapist is going to
start "giving" and the patient should shift his stance
accordingly. The patient's image of the interactional
context has changed.
4) Internal Schemata
In discussing the various images that go into
shaping a person's interactional-cognitive stance we have
periodically alluded to the fact that these images are
influenced, to a great extent, by pre-existing cognitive
templates. The power of these pre-existing schemata to
shape images is so important that this topic deserves a
separate discussion.
Our working images of Self, of Other, and of the
Relationship are not generated out of thin air, based only
upon the incoming raw data of one's experience. These
images can instead be seen as being the product of both
incoming data and pre-existing latent images that are
activated by certain features of a person's experience.
Thus, a patients working image of his or her therapist at
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any point in time may be shaped, to varying degrees, by
internal schemata. These internal schemata are a
function of the patient's personal history and may or may
not prevent the patient from accurately seeing the "real-
therapist. The act of seeing a therapist in terms of pre-
existing images is classically known as transference.
Clinically, this is an extremely useful concept, for it
gives us a handle on understanding how a patient goes
about distorting his or her world. What this means in
terms of characterizing a person's interactional-cognitive
stance is that it alerts us to another important source,
other than the data of one's experience, from which images
of Self, Other, and the Relationship are created.
For example, immediately following the announce-
ment that he was going to be seen once, instead of twice,
a week, a patient describes his therapist as being out of
touch with how bad his difficulties currently are and as
incorrectly seeing him as improving. In this case, it
appeared that such a move on the part of the therapist
activated a latent, but powerful, internal image of an
insensitive caretaker who tends to "wean too early", that
is, withdraws support on the incorrect assumption that the
patient can handle things on his own. This image was,
indeed, consistent with the patient's early history as an
independent young child who impressed everyone with his
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apparent self-sufficiency. The point here is that an
internal image was activated in this patient that served
to dominate how the patient was to subsequently •see." the
therapist.
5) Cognitive Style
A very different approach toward characterizing an
individual's interactional-cognitive stance involves
looking at the person's rules for processing information.
This approach looks at a person's cognitive stance in
terms of its software-
- the redundant patterns in which
information is gathered, stored, and ultimately trans-
formed into interactional meanings. Other terms which cap-
ture some of what is being discussed here include
"heuristics", "interpretive rules", and "cognitive style".
The emphasis here is on characterizing process
rather than content; i.e., looking at how information is
being used rather than on identifying the content of this
information. Thus, describing a paranoid person's
interactional-cognitive stance only in terms of a long
list of threatening images misses a critical point. This
person's stance toward the world should also be charac-
terized in terms of a cognitive style--a style whose
effect is to produce such consistent images.
The line between process and informational content
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is far from clear cut. For example, a patient whose
image of self has recently shifted from that of being
inferior and incompetent to one of competence may also
shift in his style of engaging the world; possibly
shifting from a rather tight obsess iveness to a more
expansive looseness. In this case, a shift in a specific
cluster of cognitions about himself brought about a change
in the style in which he processed and responded to the
world
.
6) Plan of Action
The "components" of the interactional-cognitive
set that we have discussed thus far are concerned pri-
marily with images of a person's self and the social
world. The emphasis has been primarily on identifying
the types of mental pictures that shape one's interac-
tional stance. However, the process by which these images
actually shape behavior has only been indirectly alluded
to. The focus of this discuss ion- -" plans of action"
--attempts to look more closely at those cognitions which
more directly guide one's behavior.
A plan of action might be defined as those cogni-
tions which organize and direct a person's behavior. In
stressing this notion, we are underlining the point of
view that people play an active, intentional, role in
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their relationships. That is, people are more than just
passive responders to their external environment. They
are directed by internally generated ideas (i.e. "plans
of action") about how they want to behave. Thus, rela-
tionships, including the psychotherapy relationship
, can
best be seen as a dance, of sorts, with each participant
moving to their own set of relational intent ional i t ies
.
Again, it should be stressed that such "plans of
action" do not exist as isolated mental entities but
instead are intermingled with the other aspects of one's
interactional-cognitive stance. A "plan of action" is
that part of this constellation of meanings that is, in a
sense, most proximal to a person's actual behavior It
answers the question, "So what should I do now?". For
example, a patient's persistent efforts to get advice from
a therapist is a direct outgrowth of certain images that
are held about oneself, the therapist, and the relation-
ship (Possibly this patient views psychotherapy in terms
of a doctor-relationship; alternatively, the patient may
have an unrealistic image of the therapist as all-knowing
and omnipotent)
. Out of these images emerges a plan of
action.
While understanding psychotherapy in terms of the
.
motivational context can be a powerful way of looking at
the clinical exchange it also poses some difficulties. In
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the first place, there is rarely only one "plan of action"
behind any piece of interaction. Anyone who has sat
through a case conference where every participant seems to
hold a different, but equally plausible, understanding of
a patient's behavior, can readily testify to this. This
suggests that interactional behavior can best be seen as
the result of a number of converging internal plans.
This, unfortunately, can make the task of identifying a
person's internal motivational stance extremely complex
and laced with a great deal of indeterminancy
.
For example, a female patient describing a
troubling incident that she has recently had with her
mother might be understood in terms of a number of "plans
of action". Most immediately, she may simply be trying to
offer a coherent and meaningful account of the incident.
Her plan of action, at this level, might be "Describe the
incident". Somewhat less immediately, she may be trying
to convey a sense of how painful her relationship with her
mother can be. Her operating plan might be, "Try to get
the therapist to understand how difficult my mother is."
At a much broader level, her narrative might be
part of a larger effort to gain the emotional support of
those around her. In her own words, her plan might be "By
conveying a sense of how inadequately my mother cares for
me, I am trying to gain the emotional support of those
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around me, including the therapist." At a still broader
level, the story might be part of the patient's general
effort to arrive at a comfortable pleasure/pain balance.
In this case, the patient's goal might be "Try to
increase the likelihood that I will experience as
favorable as possible pleasure/pain balance." '
In this example, the various plans that can be
attached to this one piece of behavior can be differen-
tiated along a continuum of generality, ranging from the
broadest life-plans (e.g., "to arrive at a favorable
pleasure/pain balance") to much more narrowly focused and
immediate sub-plans (e.g., "to describe the incident with
mother"). Since every piece of behavior can be poten-
tially viewed at any place along this continuum, the task
of identifying plans of action can be quite unwieldy,
unless one imposes some kind of guidelines as to what
level of generality will be used to infer these plans. In
psychotherapy, we usually restrict ourselves to consider-
ing patient plans that are clinically relevant, and to
consider therapist plans in terms of therapeutic strategy.
It should be recognized, however, that the parameters used
to determine which plans are important are somewhat
arbitrary. Important breakthroughs in clinical theory
often call into question these boundaries and force us to
look in another direction for these plans.
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The difficulty of understanding interactional
behavior in terms of a "plan of action" is not only
because plans can exist at different levels of generality.
Even within a certain level of generality, different (and
even contradictory) plans can be inferred. For example, a
patient who comes to therapy in a very productive and
cooperative state, exclaiming that the previous session
(in which he had been extremely uncooperative and negative
about the therapy) was a turning point for him, may have
had a genuine breakthrough and is now trying to move for-
ward in the therapy. Alternatively, his "good" behavior-
may be in response to the fear that he has hurt the
therapist and, as "a response, he is out to make amends.
Another complicating feature of "plans of action"
is that they are often quite labile. They are being for-
mulated and reformulated from moment to moment in response
to shifts in the larger cognitive net in which they are
embedded. This larger net of cognitions (i.e., the
interactional-cognitive stance) is, in turn, constantly
adjusting to the meanings that are emerging from the per-
son's ongoing experience of the interaction. Once again,
the image of a three-dimensional flexible jig-saw puzzle
of interlocking mental images comes to mind. A shift in
any one meaning in this larger puzzle might result in a
shift in the entire structure of the cognitive net, with
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the result that one's "plans of action" also end up
shifting.
The task of inferring a plan of action is further
complicated by the fact that most people are not comple-
tely aware of (or are unable to precisely articulate) the
plans under which they are operating. If we were to
abruptly stop a therapy session and ask therapist and
patient to describe the respective plans of action, it is
very likely that each would be at a loss for words. Plans
of action often direct behavior without being accessible
in easily retrievable verbal form. Thus, there does not
exist some final authority upon which to determine the
"real" plan of action. However, through the careful and
methodical use of video and audio tape, it does appear
that such inference can be arrived at through a fairly
structured process of consensual validation.
7) State
Our last approach toward understanding a person's
interactional-cognitive stance takes a very different
track--a track that may be considered somewhat out-of-
step with the approaches so far discussed. We are forced,
however, to take the risk of expanding our conceptual
framework to include such "messy" terrain because this
perspective seems so very important in our common-
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sense view of human interaction.
In simplest terms, people's actions toward one
another arise out of their mental "state". The concept of
"state" was briefly discussed much earlier and it might be
useful to repeat its definition. "State" refers to the
organized constellation of emotional, perceptive, cogni-
tive, and behavioral tendencies which we commonly label as
one's "mood". While a straightforward reading of this
definition of "state" can easily keep us within the boun-
daries of a purely cognitive (mental is tic ) framework, if
we read between the lines, it also hints at the possibi-
lity of viewing behavior in terms that are more than just
cognitive. If a person's "organized constellation of emo-
tional, perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral tendencies"
are seen as only indicators of something more basic going
on with an individual, then we are left with an
interesting possibility. Perhaps a person's "state" can
best be explained in terms of the status of the person's
cognitive hardware. What is being suggested here is that
the notion of state demands that we look at people and
their interactional behavior in terms of the physical sta-
tus of their cognitive wiring.
From this perspective, patterns of thinking,
feeling, and behaving can be seen as a function of
discrete and identifiable physical conditions (i.e.
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"states"). At this point in our research technology,
however, we cannot characterize these conditions in physi-
cal terms. They can only be characterized by their obser-
vable psychological endpoints. What this suggests is that
the status of an individual's cognitive hardware can
result to a predictable constellation of inter-related
cognitions
.
The physical to cognitive link is by no means one
way. A persons' thoughts and mental imagery can also push
one into a particular state. Therapists who employ mental
imagery to induce relaxation are directly exploiting this
connection. To further complicate matters, physical and
environmental influences can also influence a person's
state. Thus, while the self-observation that one is being
socially competent may switch one into a relaxed and con-
fident state, it is also true that alcohol might do the
same thing.
This final perspective complicates matters because
we are, in essence, suggesting that people are more than
just purely cognitive creatures-- that we act on more than
just thought. The notion of "state" has been used to
expand our conception of how behavior is generated so that
the physical status of one's mental apparatus is also con-
sidered into the equation.
We have just completed a rather exhaustive
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discussion of the various ways in which one can go about
analyzing the interactional-cognitive stance of an indivi-
dual. What hopefully stands out above all of the details
of this presentation is the centrality of this concept in
understanding the pragmatics of the therapeutic relation-
ship. This notion is our primary conceptual tool for
understanding how the therapeutic interaction takes on a
particular direction and shape. Before leaving this topic,
1 would like to share some additional refinements to our
working notion of the "cognitive- interact ional stance".
One interesting view of this notion of the
"interactional-cognitive stance" is that it represents the
mental "black-box" that transforms input, in the form of
sensory data from the world and existing mental images,
into output, in the form of a behavioral response. The
input end of the box contains the perceptual and interpre-
tive apparatus which are employed in order to apprehend
and make sense of the world. Further toward the middle of
the box are the mental templates and images which are
activated by a particular patterning of environmental sti-
muli. It is on the basis of these existing schemata that
one makes sense (both consciously and unconcsciously) of
one's current
. situation . The output end of this box con-
tains those assumptions and mental operations that trans-
form these act ivated images into "plans of act ion" . The
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"plans of action" are response-oriented schemata that
guide our behavior.
While this metaphor of a compartmentalized "black
box" of mental functioning is an appealing way to begin to
order our thoughts on the subject, we should quickly make
explicit its limitations. We are essentially trying to
construct a cybernetic information processing model of the
therapeutic interaction. We have to be careful about the
words and metaphors that we use to depict this view of
human functioning. Most of our tools of discourse are
based on a Newtonian, and not a cybernetic view of the
world. Thus, it is easy to begin using language or images
that have an overly linear feel to them. We should be
turning away from this "billiard-ball" view of causality.
Instead we should be trying to model how information
interacts and how meanings emerge. To view cognitive phe-
nomena in an overly step-wise manner glosses over the
complexity of how mental constructs are processed.
Thus, a more cybernetic view of the "interactional
cognitive set" is that of a collection of various bits of
information that are combined and arranged into a variety
of mental images. The bulk of our discussion has essen-
tially revolved around how one might organize these bits
of lower order information into useful clusters of
meaning. We highlight three higher order images: Images of
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self, Image of the Other; Image of the Relationship. These
various thought fragments, as well as composite images,
are continuously interacting with each other through the
exhcange of information (and not energy). Thus, these
interactions might be seen in terms of accommodation
rather than in terms of causation. One possible area of
inquiry that might shed some light on how such accom-
modation takes place is from information processing theory
and artificial intelligence.
Having completed this detailed excursion into the
cognitive pragmatics responsible for guiding the course of
the patient- therapist interaction, we can conclude this
chapter by restating in its most basic form, the essence of
Channel of Influence #3: Patients are continuously
stepping outside of their experience of the clinical
interaction and developing images and evaluations of them-
selves. These self- impressions can, under certain con-
ditions, meaningfully alter the patient's enduring sense
of self. In the following chapter, I more directly
address the issue of how such alterations take place.
CHAPTER VII
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE
Qur_Qverall Framework
Before we move into the details of the change pro-
cess it may be useful to step back a bit in order to pre-
sent a clearer picture of the larger framework in which
this discussion is embedded.
When we are talking about the three channels of
influence we are essentially talking about three different
types (admittedly interconnected) of environmental stimuli
which can potentially be the basis for therapeutic
influence. Channel # 1 stresses the content of the thera-
pist consciously motivated verbal interventions. Channel
#2 highlights the analogic communica t ional behavior out of
which the therapists' working image of the patient is
inferred. Finally, Channel #3 stresses the nature of the
therapist-patient interaction.
The factors which shape these three types of
environmental stimuli are complex and mult ifaceted
. This
thesis has focused only on the factors responsible for
shaping Channel #3, which has just been discussed in great
detail under the heading, "The Pragmatics of the
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Therapeutic Interaction." Time constraints have, unfor-
tunately, made it impossible to look at those factors
behind the first two types of environmental stimuli. Such
an analysis would undoubtedly have given us a much wider
picture of the clinical process. In particular, it would
have forced us to more closely examine the inner pro-
cessing done by the therapist to arrive at a verbal inter-
vention (Channel #1) or interactional stance (Channel #2).
What these three types of environmental stimuli
have in common, in terms of the perspective being deve-
loped here, is that they form the objective basis, for
the patient's inner experience of the therapeutic
situation. However, the link between the objective
properties of the therapeutic dialogue and changes in the
patient's self-concept is often far from direct. This is
especially true for Channels #2 and #3 when the messages
from the therapist and the interaction are not explicitly
stated. In these instances, the link between environmen-
tal stimuli and inner experience is mediated by a complex
process of meaning making.
This process of meaning making differs for
each individual. Everyone has a personal set of interpretive
rules and cognitive templates that are used to make
sense of their world. Thus, the way an individual apprehends
the clinical situation can be quite idiosyncratic and
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unpredictable. This makes the task of characterizing
exactly how the therapeutic interaction is influencing the
patient's self concept extremely difficult for the outside
observer. The clinical process must ultimately be
understood by looking through the eyes (both conscious and
unconscious) of the patient. For example, consider the
patient who is convinced that he is lacking in any basic
worth. This patient expects to see his experience,
including the therapeutic experience, in ways which con-
firm this view of himself. In this case, the pre-existing
template, "I lack basic worth," is a powerful lens shaping
this patient's view of and response to the therapeutic
interaction. For this patient, a therapist's stance of
concern is seen as pity, while the very act of coming to
therapy is seen as an indicator of one's abnormality.
An all- important subset of the meanings which make
up a patient's total experience of the clinical situation
are those impressions that define the patient's self. It
is out of this constant stream of self
- impres s ions that a
patient begins to fashion and refashion a core sense of
self. In modelling this process, it is important that we
not limit ourselves to thinking only in terms of composite
self - identities or higher-order self-cognitions. In fact,
many of the self- impress ions that are apprehended from the
therapeutic transaction are quite limited in their focus.
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Thus, change in psychotherapy, at this microscopic Level,
invovles the acquisition of small bits and pieces of
information about the self. whether they are based on the
therapist's direct verbal interventions (Channel #1), the
therapist's interactional posture (Channel #2), or the
patterning of the interaction (Channel #3), these com-
munications are likely to revolve around discrete aspects
of the person's entire constellation of self-images. As
we shall later see, this has important implications about
how we might understand the process of change.
Hewitt's (1984) analysis is again useful. It
provides us with a framework to classify the various kinds
of self- impressions that one might experience during the
course of an interaction. Thus, these self-impressions
might revolve around one's role or identity; around one's
traits or qualities; or around one's self-evaluations. In
addition, these messages about the self may be at dif-
ferent levels of generality, ranging from situational ly
specific self-images to those that are more enduring and
inclus ive
.
Change, according to the model being presented
here, involves the acquisition of new ways to look at
self. It means operating from a new constellation of
self -cognitions
. Emerging from the patient's phenomeno-
logy of the therapeutic interaction, certain images and
105
impressions about the patient are able to alter or even
dislodge those that had previously directed the patient's
way of being in the world. The important question at
this point is what are the factors that facilitate this
process
.
Factors Facilitating Change
One way to approach this question is to consider
the nature of the self
- impres s ions which are apprehended
during the course of the therapeutic interaction.
Obviously, if change is going to happen, these incoming
self- impressions must be somehow different than those that
already exist in the patient's self-system.
There are a number of implications to this. It is
clear that the patient must somehow be exposed to
something different. Using our framework, this could
involve the therapist communicating a novel way of
understanding the patient, it could involve a therapist
taking on an atypical posture toward the patient, or it
could involve having the therapist engage in a new pattern
of relating. There is very little opportunity for change
if the patient's environment remains the same. This is
perhaps the prime tactical consideration for a therapist
using this orientation.
However, just becaue a patient is exposed to dif-
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ferent environmental stimuli does not guarantee that he or
she will also develop different, and possible change faci-
litating, self-impressions. Many patients are so rigid in
their way of perceiving and interpreting their experience
that they can easily bend a therapist's best efforts to
create new meanings back into old and familiar patterns.
Thus, a therapist must often go beyond simply creating an
atypical interactional context if the patient's self-
system is going to change. They also have to alter the
patient's ways of making sense of the clinical situation.
To further complicate matters, too much novelty
will discourage change. As most therapists quickly learn,
introducing too much divergence into the clinical
situation is likely to shut the patient off. Thus, it is
only when the discrepancy between incoming and existing
self-images stay within manageable limits that patients
are open to influence.
Revisions of the self-concept are most meaningful
when they occur at a level that is both enduring and
generalizable
. This suggests that meaningful change
involve higher order self-cognitions and/or a change in
the entire gestalt of the self-system. This can occur in
a number of ways. A patient may be exposed to one of
those rare clinical situations that powerfully challenges
the patient's highest order conceptions of self. In a
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somewhat related fashion, a patient may experience a
therapy in a way that effectively alters a very small but
extremely important "lynchpin" impression of self. By
altering this one key element of the self-matrix the
patient's entire view of self is drastically altered. For
example, consider a recent patient of mine whose avoidant
and obsessive qualities were threatening to completely
undermine his ability to effectively live. Although he
had an intricate and, at times, convincing rationale for
his difficulties, it soon became apparent that much of his
pattern of dealing with the world was largely to accom-
modate his discomfort with unstructured social interac-
tions. This discomfort, in turn, arose out of a basic
conviction that he was uncontrollably needy and dependent
and that, as such, could not be tolerated by another in a
relationship. Consequently, this patient's entire
existence was devoted to either avoiding relationships or,
when he was forced to interact, to be in complete control.
His fear was that if his dependency was to leak out, he
would quickly be seen as undesirable and a "drain". If
this basic assumption about himself were to shift,
however, it is reasonable that many other features of his
self-system would also change, including all of those
cognitions that kept him isolated and pre-occupied about
staying in absolute control. Thus, by strategically
IS
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altering this one constellation of self- impressions it
possible that through a "domino" effect the patient
entire stance toward the environment might change.
Meaningful change, however, is more likely to be
much less dramatic. If most of the self
- impres s ions that
get communicated during the therapeutic interaction are
generally confined to small, lower-order parts of the
patient's self-system, as I have previously suggested,
then change involves the progressive accumulation of these
rather focussed new meanings about the self. Thus, drama-
tic personality change would be the result of many small
changes that eventually reach a point where a major shift
in the entire gestalt (along with revisions in higher-
order self-cognitions) is catalyzed.
Somewhat related to this, is the common obser-
vation that change occurs well after a session, or even an
entire therapy, is over. What might be happening here is
that the results of the many small self-concept changes
that have occured in the course of the therapy have stayed
below this crucial threshhold point and thus, have
remained "invisible". However, the cumulative effect of
these unexpressed revisions is to make the entire self-
structure vulnerable to a drastic shift, given the right
configuration of environmental stimuli. When the patient
is later exposed to a trigger situation
,
meaningful but
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delayed change occurs. This concept of threshold allows
us to stress the importance of microscopic self-changes
and also acknowledge the fact of discontinuous change.
Finally, certain aspects of the patient's self-
system are, at times, more susceptible to influence. In a
sense, individuals are primed to respond to particular
kinds of interactional experiences. For example, an over-
protected adolescent may respond dramatically to a therapy
that generates self-images having to do with independence
and autonomy. This same adolescent, however, may have
very little reaction to an equally atypical interaction
that, in contrast, is structured to bring out the
teenager's caretaking qualities. In this case, those
self-images having to do with mastery and autonomy are
more salient to the patient's developmental struggle, and
thus, they are more likely to bring about change.
What this suggests is that change is not a random
process determined only by the self- impressions that are
generated in response to relating to the world and others.
Rather, people have internal plans that determine whai
kinds of new self-images they are more likely to incor-
porate. The crucial clinical task then becomes iden-
tifying the latent self-images that are "waiting" to be
tapped and then to structure the therapeutic interaction
accordingly. What clinicians must ultimately rely on to
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get a sense of these inner plans, even more than formal
development theory, is a well-tuned sense of empathy.
"Empathy" in this case refers to the accurate iden- •
tification of those latent images of self that the patient
is ready to incorporate into his or her view of self.
The nature of the therapeutic relationship is perhaps
even more important that the nature of the communicated
self images.
1
In a non-facilitat ive relationship, even the
best formulated intervention will have little effect.
There are certain qualities in a therapist-patient rela-
tionship that facilitate the process of influence. In
fact, a whole literature exists in social psychology that
attempts to address the issue of interpersonal influence!
The intent here is not to cover in any systematic fashion
this large area of theory and research. For an extensive
discussion of this literature from a clinical perspective
see Strong and Claiborn (1982). Instead, the discussion
will be limited to considering two factors which seem
especially important to any model of therapeutic
1 It should be noted that these two concepts, i.e.,
the nature of the therapeutic relationship and the nature
of the communicated self-images are, in reality, very
interrelated. After all, the nature of the therapist's
interactional stance (Channel #2) determines both the
self-message and the relational context in which the
message is communicated. Likewise, the nature of the
r elat ionship ( Channel #3) serves as both the message and
the medium in which it is delivered.
1 1
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influence
.
The first factor concerns interpersonal power.
The more power the patient attributes to the therapist,
the greater the likelihood that the therapist's view of
the world (including the therapist's view of the patient)
will be incorporated into the patient's own view. Power,
in this sense, is realted to how willing the patient is
willing to see things like the therapist.
The second factor involves the "significance" of
the therapeutic relationship. More precisely, the more
the patient is dependent on the therapist, the more likely
is the patient to alter his or her way of viewing the
world (including the view of self) in order to stay on
congruent terms with the therapist. If the patient has
little need for the relationship, there is likely to be
little interpersonal pressure to accommodate to the terms
of the relationship-- terms which may require a shift in
the way one looks at reality.
This viewpoint has an obvious clinical implica-
tion. Before therapists can exert any influence, they
first have to make sure that they are indeed in a position
where influence is possible. Thus, much of the work of
do ing therapy is maneuvering the relationship toward this
end
.
CHAPTER VIII
A CASE ILLUSTRATION
What follows is an attempt to make more concrete
one of the central features of the conceptual framework
developed in the preceeding pages. Using process
vignettes from an actual psychotherapy case, I illustrate
how the therapeutic interaction can alter important
aspects of the patient's enduring sense of self ("channel
of influence #3" in the above scheme). In particular,
this case material demonstrates how the therapist-patient
interaction can generate meanings which can confirm or
disconfirm important elements of the patient's self-
system. I present three vignettes from the case, two
which serve to confirm the patient's self-concept and
might be considered stable sequences and one which serves
to disconfirm the patient's self-concept, that is, an
unstable sequence.
The case involved a young man in his late twenties
who was convinced that he was not capable of engaging in
satisfying relationships. In his mind, he was an into-
lerable drain destined to repel anyone who was able to get
close to him. This case discussion uses actual sequences
of therapist-patient interaction to show how this central
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self- impression was both reinforced and challenged tn the
course of the therapy. As of this ^^ ^
currently involved in the case as the therapist.
As has been repeatedly stressed, the self-concept
is an interlocking constellation of cognitive and affec-
tive mental structures. In order to meaningfully examine
the fate of any one element in this overall complex a
great deal of context is necessary. Thus, this case
illustration includes much more than just the analysis of
isolated segments of process data but also includes a
great deal of background material as well.
Mr. Smith was a bright young man who came to
psychotherapy because of a paralyzing inability to chose a
career direction. As a result, he had become increasingly
depressed and reclusive, spending most of his time ^pro-
ductively obsessing over all of the career options
available to him. He felt he had been floundering for far
too long and was beginning to fear that he was destined to
be a failure.
Up until the previous year, Mr. Smith had ambi-
tiously pursued a corporate career, and had, in a very
short time, successfully positioned himself as a junior
manager doing personnel work for a large corporation.
However, he had become extremely uncomfortable with some
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of the responsibilities of his new position and had left
his position hoping to "find himself" and to pursue a
career direction more compatible with his personality.
It was clear that Mr. Smith's career confusion was
closely related to deeper psychological issues concerning
interpersonal relationships and a maladaptive self-image.
While Mr. Smith thrived on the respect and admiration that
came with working with others in a managerial capacity, he
was also frightened of the social contact that was also
required of such a position. Mr. Smith found it
impossible to comfortably engage in all but the most
structured and task oriented situations. He hated what he
termed the "cocktail socializing" that was required of a
corporate junior executive. Mr. Smith quit several pro-
raising positions because of the painful anxiety he felt
about the social demands of his position.
Behind his reservations about socializing was the
fear that, without the structure of a task orientation, he
would be exposed as socially inadequate and, ultimately,
undesirable. One of the most prominent features to this
negative view of himself was that he would become an
uncomfortable drain on those around him. Mr. Smith
believed that his interpersonal needs would prove to.be
overwhelming to those around him. He was convinced that
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he could not be satisfied or comforted by another indivi-
dual and, were he to let his real self out with all of
these needs, he would only be left wanting more, •
frustrated, and disappointed. Mr. Smith's response was
to vigilantly guard against revealing himself and to
structure his life to avoid real emotional contact.
This appraisal of himself not only left him iso-
lated, but also served to reinforce Mr. Smith's total
preoccupation with becoming a career success. If he could
only become somebody of importance, he would finally be in
the position to relate with others and gain their respect
and appreciation. Until he achieved such status, rela-
tionships made him feel much too vulnerable. Mr. Smith's
existence was dominated by an all-out drive to prove him-
self in a career. He proudly labelled himself a workaho-
lic and said he would not hesitate to work twenty-hours,
seven days a week if he could only find a job to which he
felt committed. The problem for Mr. Smith, however, was
that he was unable to make such a committment.
Mr. Smith's uncertainties in choosing a career
direction only reinforced his view that he was an into-
lerable drain to those around him. For while he was
caught up in a desperate struggle to find a career, Mr.
Smith saw relationships in terms of this all-encompassing
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pre-occupation. What he hoped to extract from those who
were closest to him was some guidance as to what he should
be doing with his life. In a sense, he harbored the magi-
cal expectation that someone around him might be able to
free him from his predicament. Thus, the assessment that
his needs were impossible to meet was borne out in
reality. Perhaps we can schematize this constellation of
Mr. Smith's self system in the following manner (Figure
2).
Vignette #1 ; A Stable Sequence
The following exchange came during the ninth
session of Mr. Smith's therapy. In the previous session,
Mr. Smith had been told that sessions would soon be sche-
duled only once instead of twice a week. Mr. Smith came
to the session visibly upset and extremely negative about
his life in general and the therapy in particular. It
eventually emerged that he felt the therapist had decided
to cut back on the sessions based on the incorrect assump-
tion that things were getting better. Mr. Smith was ada-
ment in stressing how desperate he continued to feel and
that he had made very little progress toward finding a
career direction. According to Mr. Smith, the
understanding about himself and his situation that he had
ily interpersonal needs are unmeetab le <
I am an intolerable drain
I am unlovable
The only way I can finally be loved i
by achieving success
I am uncertain about how to find success
1 want those around me (friends, family, therapist) to
show me the way to success
I am disappointed, frustrated and angry because no one can
tell me how to be a success
Figure 2. Explication of Mr. Smith's "1 am a drain" self-
conception
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gained In the first month of therapy was proving to be
useless
.
In the following passage we see how Mr. Smith's
reaction to the therapist's decision to cut back the fre-
quency of his session quickly escalates in an angry attack
on the therapy.
Mr. Smith: I get the idea that you're sayingthat before twice a week was saying that we
needed to do a lot of work (pressured delivery
stumbling over his words). Now that it's once ' a
week I get the assumption that we've made a lot
of headway and yet I understand myself better.
Therapist: Uh huh.
Mr. Smith: But I can't apply it any better.
That really the reason where I was before cause
I had a pretty good idea of who I was but I just
couldn't apply it and I still
. . . that's when
I first talked to you I said to you I had done
an awful lot of thought on myself (angry
demanding tone of voice) but I don't know how to
apply it. I'm no better off now and I don't
know where we are heading. We could talk more
about who I am and I could understand myself
100% but I still won't know how to go out and
find something that fits it.
Therapist: You're feeling that my decision to
go to once a week is somehow a mispercep t ion
that things are getting better.
Mr. Smith: Yeah.
Therapist: And that actually what you're trying
to do is to work harder and that cutting back to
once a week is kind of like saying "relax,
things are going ok."
Mr. Smith: I don't know. I am curious if
that's the reasoning behind it. I don't know if
anything is any better except that I understand
myself a little better.
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Ihll h»* I VT thlnk that r ' ve ^0k«d atw at as happened over the last few sessions andhave concluded that things are better or you?And that's not true? y
Mr Smith: I understand myself better. But Idon t consider that
. . . that not the real
ioO'/Vh.r^ iV.: l f 1 d °n,t understand myseltlOO/o that wouldn t be a major hurdle for me As
I said my major hurdle in coming to you andmajor hurdle for my suicidal problem and
everything else is that I don't know how to
apply any of this.
Mr. Smith continues along this vein for a while and
finally concludes:
Mr. Smith: At this point 1 feel still ashelpless as I did two months ago. Like I say I
understand myself a little better but I really
do not believe that if we talk once a week for
two years and I know myself 1(30% that it's going
to make a shit of difference as to when I walk
out of here my ability to apply it and find
something that's satisfying to do the rest of my
Life. That's the major problem and 1 don't
think we've dealt with it.
Therapist: 1 think my suggestion to cut back to
once a week has really gotten you upset.
Mr. Smith: When you first mentioned I thought,
"I don't give a shit. Fine, he thinks things are
going places once a week and this will be
worthless." And I just said, "Jesus we were
making some headway and I began to know myself
better" and I thought "that was going to leading
someplace. Now obviously he thinks that's a
good success and he's going to say. Well, we'll
just slowly take it on and on and I'll be
sitting at home for another year. My late twen-
ties will be spent watching "The Price is
Right."
He later continues on this theme; emphasizing how utterly
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dependent on the therapy he has become.
Mr Smith: I guess I'm just grabbing at straws
I don't know what the answers are and r m cer-tainly having no luck outside of here and I wastrying to use this as a possibility for findingsomething and it its down to one hour a week andthere are seven days each week and twenty- fourhours each day and I'm looking forward to onehour a week and the rest of the week I am doing
nothing I don' t know. It just seems how much
can that one hour a week be?
Mr. Smith is clearly feeling abandoned. What is
interesting, however, is that the terms he sets for the
relationship to be satisfying (that he be somehow guided
to the right career) are impossible to meet, whether the
sessions are once, twice, or even five times a week.
Mr. ^ Smith: (extremely agitated and tearful) Idon't want to commit suicide. (raising his
voice) Yet I have no idea what to do. I'm
tired of sitting at home. (crying)
Therapist: Last time we talked about your rela-
tionships in the corporate situation. You
talked about how relationships are so difficult
in that environment. How you feel vulnerable
because you don't feel you have complete control
and that you are required to get things done
socially, which you hate.
Mr. Smith: (much calmer) The problem was that
I never felt qualified for my jobs. I didn't
have the right tools and it only got worse in my
last job.
Taking the cue from the therapist, Mr. Smith calms
down and proceeds to spend the remainder of the session
exploring why his past jobs did not fit. With the thera-
pist actively leading the way with questions, Mr. Smith
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eventually shares that much of his discomfort is because
he feels so awkward around his fellow workers. He finally
suggests that the reason he feels so ill at ease is that
he doesn't feel "there is much to me" when it comes to
sharing himself in a social situation.
While Mr. Smith does begin to engage in some per-
sonal exploration, the dominant tone of the interaction
remains essentially the same: Mr. Smith crying out for a
solution to his difficulties. At the end of the session,
the therapist finally gives him a "solution," of sorts:
Therapist: In order to deal more comfortably
with the demands of living, it looks like you
may have to deal with people on terms that
include more than just work.
In a sense, the therapist has responded to Mr. Smith's
pleas and has offered a solution. In the above passage,
the therapist has "agreed" to play out the relationship on
Mr. Smith's terms. The therapist is somehow supposed to
guide Mr. Smith to a decision about how to direct his
life. It's an untenable position, however, for Mr. Smith
is set to do battle with anyone who tells him to do
something which he feels is not himself.
Thus, the dialogue following the above observation
by the therapist proceeds as follows:
Mr. Smith: (raised voice, argumentative) I
don 1 t know about that. Some people out there
are able to just work and be succes sful. There
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are lots of people like me out there So
lole)
&n 1 find
°
ne
°
f the niche" (demanding
Therapist: I have a feeling that if you wentdown the want ads, almost all of then/woulTrequire that you deal with people.
Mr. Smith: You are probably right. Most iobs
rdV°
C
MaVnd foV°rkLolfc 8 : So whafcanI do? aybe you can give me some mind exercisesto get me out of this. I'm totally stuck? Ihave some understanding about who I am but Idon t know how to apply it. (agitated anddemanding tone)
As long as Mr. Smith successfully pushes the therapeutic
interaction into the familiar "help me figure out my
career direction" mode, his enduring sense of himself as a
noxious drain will continuously be confirmed.
V ignette #2: Another Stable Sequence
The second illustrative sequence comes at the very
end of session #13. Once again we see Mr. Smith making an
impossible demand on the therapist. In this case it comes
as a request for an extra session just as he is leaving
the therapy room.
Therapist: I see our time is up.
Mr. Smith: If it . . . You know is it possible
to get one appointment maybe in the next week or
two? (tentative sounding)
Therapist: Urn. (undecided tone)
Mr. Smith: I don't want to ... we can discuss
the possibility when you might be available
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because I don't want to say right now but I wasthinking earlier this week that I'd really Uto talk with you an extra day this week and Idon't want to set it up on a'regular basis butbeing that January is when I am supposed to bestarting ray accounting course.
Therapist: Let's meet at our regular time nextweek and we can talk about it some more Ithink I'd like to talk about that.
Mr Smith: You sound like a parent, (laughing)That means no. ° & '
Therapist: well, we can talk about it.
(Patient exits)
Mr. Smith is so ready to see himself as an
unwanted burden that he assumes the therapist neutral
response (ie, "let's talk about it") means that his
request will be rejected. Mr. Smith has "carefully"
constructed an interpersonal situation that guarantees
that his self-schemata will remain intact.
Vignette #3: An Unstable Sequence
In the following sequence, the therapist engages
Mr. Smith in a way that challenges his belief that he is
an intolerable drain. In this exchange, Mr. Smith begins
to share himself in a way that is satisfying to both him
and the therapist. In so doing, Mr. Smith has a new way
of looking at himself: That he is not toxic and that he
has the capacity to engage in mutually gratifying rela-
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t ionships
.
The following dialogue comes immediately after Mr.
Smith has described his uncertainty about beginning a
training program in a new career direction, accounting.
He finally exclaims, in exasperation, that his situation
is too complicated and confusing to piece together a logi-
cal resolution. The therapist uses this opportunity to
push Mr. Smith to consider something he is not used to
exploring, his emotions.
Therapist: I was just commenting on the styleyou are approaching this with. How if you couldfit the whole puzzle together just kind of logi-
cally &
Mr. Smith: (overlapping) I'd feel good about
it.
Therapist: If there is a strand out of place
Mr. Smith: (overlapping) It's not right,
(enthusiastic agreement)
Therapist: You'll feel all confused or feeling
like you're not going to be able to have the
answer
.
Mr. Smith: That's right. But then how
. . .
how?
Therapist: I guess I'm raising the possibility
that decisions are made on terms other than that
way.
Mr. Smith: Than just logic.
Therapist: Just piecing the puzzle together.
That there are feelings involved in people's
decis ions
.
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Mr. Smith: But isn't that when people make
it. (questioning tone) Isn't that true?
Therapist: What do you think?
Mr Smith: You're finally talkinpt And t hito hear you talk. You don^ t lii^to ! e ra ^much information you're finally talking(smiling) and he throws it back at me OK uwdo you think. Urn. (pause) * What
Mr. Smith proceeds to go into a rather intellectualized
discussion of his position on feelings, saying that they
usually get in the way of success. In the midst of this
rather detached monologue the therapist breaks in:
Therapist: (overlapping) How would feelingslead you astray? Can you imagine a situation?
Mr. Smith: Well. Feelings even led me astraylast year. By spending so much time with Mary
and by constantly putting off doing something
and by thinking, "Well, it will work out. Maybe
I 11 work part time because that way I can just
stay next to Mary until she moves away."
Therapist: (cutting in) What were those
feelings? with Mary?
Mr. Smith: I like that situation and I was
letting I mean it was really comfortable and so
why not just stay for awhile. And see what it
did it wasted a year. Logically when I quit myjob last year I should have started something
new. If it meant moving, just move, "sorry,
Mary."
Mr. Smith proceeds to talk in a revealing manner about his
feelings about relationships. The discussion eventually
turns to a consideration of whether or not he feels him-
self to be a drain to those around him.
Mr. Smith: In most cases, my presence isn't-usually a drain. Number one I wouldn't- iy problems at length, tCt just isn't
m
Instead, we usually talk about them?
Therapist: Sounds like you're prettv vion^*-
not to let that draining'part of you^out?
Mr. Smith: Uhuh. (agreeing enthusiastically)
Therapist: But that, also a lot of pressure onyou. You're constantly producing for the other
^rneed6:? 108 ^ entertained > taking careof
Mr. Smith: (pain in his voice) I haven't foundanybody that really wants to sit down anddiscuss me. People like to discuss themselves.
I ve never found anyone who would sit down and
say cut the horseshit, what's really going onwith you? Not the light side of you but I wantto know how you feel about it." I can do that
with other people and I do sometimes. But no
one ever does that with me. I don't think a lot
of people really care
. . . Let's face it Ihave not made a lot of deep relationships ' so
that could be part of it but umm I think a lot
of people just get frustrated if you have a
serious problem.
Mr. Smith ends the session by expanding on this
theme and sharing how disappointed he has recently felt by
his parents because they were not responding to his
current difficulties in a way that felt supportive. His
tone is pensive and much softer than his usual gruff,
businessman's style.
In response to the therapist's active invitation
to look at feelings, the tone of the interaction has
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shifted. m this exchange, Mr. Smith is no longer caught
up in the frustrating stuggle to get the therapist to help
solve his career dilemma. Instead, he is using the thera-
pist as an empathetic audience for some difficult and
highly guarded feelings. Mr. Smith is sharing that he
feels uncared for. He has taken some time off from his
battle to be a success and is allowing himself the luxury
of being "held." He has successfully made a connection
that provides him with the experiential basis toward
disconfirming the enduring sense of himself as being inca-
pable of participating in a mutually satisfying rela-
tionship. From this, Mr. Smith might begin to establish a
more secure sense of his own inadequacy and lovability.
This, in turn, might serve to take some of the
pressure off his career effort. Having discovered that he
is "good" enough to engage in a satisfying relationship,
his self-esteem no longer has to rest exclusively on his
ability to perform in an occupation. This may lighten his
burden whenever he sets out to accomplish a career goal
and free him to at last constructively engage in a career
direct ion
.
The obvious question at this point is how are we
to know whether this clinical exchange is truly represen-
tative of a transformative interactional sequence.
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Besides evaluating the process data's "face validity"
(i.e., does it seem Like an interactional sequence that
challenges enduring conceptions of the patient's self?),
are there any other more formal ways of assessing how
transformative this sequence was?
An important starting point, is to carefully
determine whether the interaction was being experienced as
truly atypical by the patient. In other words, did Mr.
Smith feel he was engaging in an interaction that
challenged his usual way of looking at himself?
Specifically, did he feel that his needs were being met in
the interaction in a way that was mutually satisfying? If
this were the case and Mr. Smith truly experienced himself
as being successfully held, then the conditions were set
to alter the enduring image of himself as an intolerable
drain
.
There are several indications that suggest that
this sequence of interaction was being experienced in such
a way. Mr. Smith's musculature and posture were quite
different. He was less stiff and seemed much more relaxed
during this passage. His voice seemed much less pressured
and much more pensive. The therapist's own feelings also
suggested that something different was happening. The
therapist was feeling much closer and more helpful. The
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therapist also experienced himself as being less pressured
into a task-oriented stance and much more emotionally
involved. While each of these indicators are not conclu-
sive in themselves, as a composite they strongly suggest
that Ilr. Smith did indeed experience this moment of
therapy in an atypical manner.
The second approach to evaluating whether this
interaction was transformative would be to evaluate its
effects. In other words, are there indications that Mr.
Smith's image of self changed as a result of this
exchange? More specifically, are there any signs that Mr.
Smith, following this session, was no longer as convinced
that he was incapable of engaging in a mutually satisfying
relationship? If such signs were apparent, then we can
assume that this interaction may have facilitated an
alteration in this aspect of Mr. Smith's self-concept.
As of this writing (one month aiter session #13)
Mr. Smith has not given any clear cut indications of such
a cognitive shift. Part of the difficulty is that Mr.
Smith is facing yet another career crisis (he no longer
wishes to pursue accounting as a career) and has, predic-
tably, become much more defensive and rigid in his
approach to relating with his therapist. Finding a career
niche once again completely dominates his attention.
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The problem in obtaining this kind of confirmation
is that such signs are typically not direct or immediate.
Just because this sequence of interaction has not resulted
in some observable change does not necessarily mean that
change has not happened. The effects might be very signi-
ficant at the cognitive level but have not had time or the
opportunity for a behavioral expression.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Toward Evaluating the Model
Let us conclude by considering several ways in
which we might go about evaluating this model of
psychotherapy. In other words, what are some of the
methods and criteria which we might use to assess the
value of the ideas which I have just presented. Time
constraints have unfortunately made it impossible to pur-
sue any of these strategies of evaluation in any systema-
tic way. They are offered here as possible directions for
future work.
We might begin by checking the model against the
guiding assumptions which provided the original direction
for this effort. Below is a list of those initial
assumpt ions :
1) The centrality of the therapeutic rela-
t ionship
The importance of looking at interpersonal
proces ses
2)
3) The importance of inner experience
4) The appropriateness of a cybernetic epis
tomology
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5) The importance of the notion of fit
6) The importance of the therapist's oer-
sonality ^
7) The similarity between the psychotherapy
relationship and other relationships infacilitating change
The importance of self /object represen-
tations
3)
As one goes through this list it is comforting to discover
that, for the most part, our working model is consistent
with these initial assumptions. While this is certainly
not the most powerful criteria upon which to evaluate the
model, it at least demonstrates that there is a basic
level of internal consistency in our theoretical effort.
Another approach towards evaluating this theoreti-
cal model asks whether the model accurately represents
"reality". In other words, can we verify the model
through direct observation. In terms of Channel #1 (i.e.,
influence through direct intervention), it is relatively
easy to envision, in general terms, a rather straightfor-
ward methodology that tests whether this framework can be
usefully applied to the clinical situation. It can be
divided into three steps:
1) Define and isolate the exact dimensions of
the patient's self-concept toward which a
particular therapist's intervention is
addressing itself.
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2) Systematically determine the pre-intervent ion status of these aspects of thepatient's self-concept.
3) Systematically determine the post-intervention status of the same dimensions
of the patient's self-concept which were
originally targeted.
Step #1
,
characterizing the nature of the
therapist's intervention, is relatively uncomplicated for
Channel #1 type of influence. In this situation, we have
easily observable and delimited behavior (i.e., the
therapist's verbal intervention) upon which to base our
observations. If we can agree on what the therapist is
saying about the patient's self-concept, then we have
basically accomplished step #1 in this method. This is in
sharp contrast to the difficulty which confronts us when
we attempt steps #2 and #3. These steps involve variables
referring to the status of the patient's self-image, a
cognitive entity which is basically invisible. The dif-
ficult challenge here is to find observable indicators, in
the form of concrete patient behavior, of the status of
the patient's self-system. As inferential as it must be,
this pre- and pos t- intervent ion assessment of the
patient's self-image is absolutely crucial if we are to be
able to conclusively "observe" this kind of influence.
If the systematic verification of Channel #1 is
difficult, then verification of Channels #2 and #3 is next
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to impossible. What is particularly difficult in these
models of influence is that the therapist intervention
is not really observable and can only be inferred. Thus,
all three steps are based on a great deal of inference,
leaving us without a firm anchoring point. It is very
likely that a group of observers will not be able to agree
on the exact nature of the therapist's intervention (i.e.,
exactly how the therapist behavior is challenging the
patient's self-system). Even if this major obstacle could
be overcome, the difficulty remains as to how to assess
its impact and whether change has indeed come about.
This is not to say that such verification is out
of the question. However, if one wishes to systematically
observe therapeutic process using these perspectives, one
has to spend a great deal of effort carefully identifying
the observable derivatives of these hypothesized cognitive
processes
.
The value of a theoretical model does not solely
rest on its ability to generate observable constructs.
Much more important is the ability to foster
understanding. This is especially important when we begin
to grapple with process phenomenon, such as the thera-
peutic interaction.
.
In these cases, the most pressing
need is to somehow develop an explanatory narrative that
allows us to link events over time. In the face of a
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constant stream of complex data, we need something that
helps us begin to see the story line. Unfortunately, this
view offers much less in the way of a method for assessing
the merits of a theoretical perspective. When one relies
on the criteria of observation, you either see the
hypothesized construct or you don't. But when the cri-
teria is the ability to generate understanding, we are on
much softer ground. This is not to suggest, however, that
such a criteria lacks value. For most clinical theory
stands or falls on the basis of whether it generates that
very personal and subjective click of understanding.
One way in which we might test this model of
psychotherapy along these lines would be to see how well
it can transform raw clinical data (preferably videotaped
psychotherapy sessions) into meaningful case concep-
.
tualization. What would be particularly telling would be
whether it shaped and ordered our percept ions of the
t herapis t-pat ient interaction in ways which illuminated
the presence or absence of change
.
This brings us to another closely related approach
to evaluat ing our model of psychotherapy proces s . It is
based on the idea that psychotherapy , at its root , is an
enterprise devoted to the process of faci li tat ing change
.
I t follows then , that good or valuable clinical theory
must ultimately serve as a useful guide toward developing
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strategies for change. In other words, we must not forget
to judge our model of therapy in terms of its usefulness;
that is, whether it helps therapists become more effective
agents of change.
This is not to suggest that clinical theory must
reduce itself to becoming only prescriptive in nature. We
certainly have enough "how to" manuals of psychothera-
peutic technique. However, models of psychotherapy that
have no implications for how one should go about
understanding and facilitating the process of change ulti-
mately lose an important source of meaning.
One can imagine an interesting experiment to test
this model along these lines. Simply let a team of clini-
cians immerse themselves in this perspective for a period
of time and have them keep track of their effectiveness of
their work. Specifically we would want to know whether
such a perspective improved their ability to understand,
either as individuals or as a group, the case material.
More importantly, however, we would want to see whether
the effectiveness of these clinicians changed signifi-
cantly. If this group of clinicians felt more effective
in doing their work and attributed it to their new model
for understanding the clinical process, then it is very
likely that the model has some utility. It is exactly
this kind of experimentation that has led to such a boom
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in the whole area of family therapy.
A final way to evaluate this theory is in terms of
aesthetics. On this score, I must admit chat the frame-
work I have developed is far from elegant. Rather than
appeal to one's sense of theoreetical simplicity, I have,
instead, set out to develop a comprehensive view of the
process of therapeutic influence. While this approach
might accurately mirror the complexity of the phenomenon
which it is attempting to describe, it also can feel cum-
bersome, and, at times, tedious. The alternative to such
a "try to capture it all" approach is to go out on a limb
and to push a particular aspect of the entire picture as
the one of significance. Such a commitment not only takes
a certain amount of courage (which I do not have at this
point) but also allows one to present a much more focused
and parsimonious model of psychotherapy.
Clinical Implications
While this model has been primarily descriptive,
rather than prescriptive, in emphasis, it nevertheless has
the ability to come down from the clouds and offer some
practical guidelines about how to think about clinical
practice. We can summarize some of these clinical impli-
cations in the following step-by-step description of its
view of the primary tasks of the therapist.
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D Identify the constellations of self-imagesthat are responsible for the patient's dif-ticulties. This may require a great deal
of exploration and digging since manyimportant features of an individual's self-image may not be part of his or her
conscious awareness.
2) Identify the key elements in the patient's
constellation of self-images. In other
words, identify those self-cognitions which
are most responsible for shaping the entire
structure of the person's self-system. If
these "lynch-pin" cognitions can be iden-
tified, they offer the therapist a very
focused way to bring about change.
3) Identify those self-cognitions that are
open to change. Patients often come in
with hidden scripts on how they would like
to change. It is extremely important Chat
the therapist gain a sense of this pre-set
script for this will direct the therapist
toward those aspects of self most amenable
to influence.
4) Having identified those self-cognitions
that are the most productive targets, the
therapist must develop strategies to bring
about the desired change. This involves
picking the best combination of channels to
use to foster the change. An integral part
of the change process involves the encoura-
gement (via any of the 3 channels) of new
self -structures that can replace those that
are currently maladaptive.
The clinical implications of our model certainly
extend beyond this brief list. The purpose of this list
is simply to offer a representative outline of how this
model of psychotherapy process can generate an approach to
actual clinical technique.
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Personal Reflections
This thesis began with some personal reflection on
the status of clinical theory. I WOuld like to end by
returning to that initial theme. Only this time, my reac-
tions are the product of having spent several years
immersed in the topic.
Most importantly, I have gained a healthy respect
for the utter complexity of the subject area. As much as
we may try, the task of making sense of the therapeutic
interaction and the process of change cannot be reduced to
simple formulae. There is good reason why the subject has
spawned such a diverse array of theoretical perspectives.
Such complexity can be overwhelming and it is often
tempting to throw in the conceptual towel. One form that
this takes for many clinicians is that formal theory is
deemed irrelevant and too clumsy for an "art form" as
subtle as psychotherapy. In this case, common sense and
one's personal intuition are seen as the legitimate guides
to doing psychotherapy. Alternatively, clinicians often
rush out and uncritically adopt existing theory. The dif-
ficulty here is that such ideas are often blindly accepted
only to buffer one from the many uncertainties of the cli-
nical situation. Both of these approaches suggest that
one has, to a degree, given up on developing a theoretical
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perspective that is personally meaningful.
In the course of working on this thesis I have
often been frustrated with the complexity of the subject
matter and have often felt that there would never be any
way to make sense of the clinical interaction in a way
that was personally meaningful. However, I emerge from
this project with a degree of optimism. I come away
feeling that I have finally been able to piece together a
view of the clinical interaction that has a great deal of
potential. To be sure, it is, in many ways, still in a
very primitive form. At least now I feel pointed in a
promising direction. What is perhaps most exciting about
this model is that it begins to integrate four diverse
perspectives: cognitive-self-theory, psychoanalytic
theory, communication theory, and information processing
theory into what is potentially a very powerful synthesis.
My optimism has been especially bolstered in the
course of doing my own actual clinical work. As my
theoretical ideas have coalesced into a more organized
framework. I have been pleasantly surprised that my abi-
lity to understand what is going on with my clients has
also gained a degree of clarity. What this suggests is
that the next step in developing this model should more
directly involve case material. The purpose here would be
to see which aspects of the model are the most helpful in
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organizing and making snese of actual clinical data.
Finally, if this thesis has taught me anything, it
has taught me that theory does not necessarily appear,
ready made, in one inspired flash of brilliance. Instead,
it is more likely to be hammered out in a gradual process
of successive approximation. As I have discovered over
the last months, this is far from a painless experience,
for it requires that one repeatedly face the realization
that one's conceptual efforts are not completely adequate
and that they must, in a sense, be given up for the
overall process to once again move forward. If one is
going to actively engage in theory construction, one has
to accept the ephemeral character of the ideas that we
labor so hard to develop. Seen in this light, theory
building is an evolutionary process of ideas moving and
changing through time. It is a process that, in spite of
our best efforts, is never finished. It is in this spirit
that I share this Master's thesis.
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